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The following thesis presents the results and analysis of three distinct experiments. The first 
features an experimental auction market designed to resemble eBay and other such peer-to-peer 
markets, including the presence of a reputation mechanism. The results presented suggest that the 
presence of a reputation mechanism will improve consumer welfare. Further, having a greater 
number of possible feedback ratings available leads to even further improvements in consumer 
welfare. The second features a repeated auction that also involves Bayesian uncertainty, about the 
`type’ of the seller. In addition, we present the predictions of a theoretical model that extends the 
existing sequential equilibrium literature into multi-player, market-based games. We find that 
reputational concerns remain an important consideration in such settings. The final experiment 
examines the role of within group heterogeneity (in the endowment and marginal return) in public 
goods games. The novel experimental designed allows for a full schema of relationships between 
the endowment and marginal return. The results presented suggest that there are significant 
behavioural differences depending on the relationship between the endowment and marginal 
return. When they are inverse, subject’s absolute contributions are not different. When the two 

































Cassio Reputation! Reputation! Reputation! Oh, I have lost my reputation! I have lost 
the immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial. My reputation, Iago, 
my reputation! 
 
Iago As I am an honest man, I thought you had received some bodily wound. There 
is more sense in that than in reputation. Reputation is a false and most idol 
imposition, oft got without merit and lost without deserving. You have lost no 
reputation unless you repute yourself such a loser.  
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Experimental economics has grown immensely since the early experiments of, for example, 
Chamberlin (1948) and Allais (1953). A survey of this early literature can be found in Roth (1995).  
Since then, experimental methods have been used to study a wide variety of economic contexts. 
Each of the proceeding chapters present the results of an experiment. The primary advantage of the 
experimental method is the ability to isolate specific effects in situations where that may not be 
possible with naturally occurring, pre-existing data.  
For example, Chapter 2 features an experiment that isolates the effect of having a reputation 
mechanism in an eBay `style’ auction. In reality, such marketplaces don’t have multiple reputation 
mechanisms at the same time and comparing between marketplaces is difficult because there may 
be many other covariates. By using an experiment, we can examine the behaviour in two otherwise 
identical markets, the only difference being the type of reputation mechanism on offer. Chapter 3 
presents a theoretical and experimental investigation into the effects of Bayesian uncertainty in a 
repeated auction setting. The advantage of using the experimental method in this case is that we can 
control the nature of the Bayesian uncertainty (homemade priors such as those identified by 
Camerer and Weigelt (1988) notwithstanding). Chapter 4 presents a study on the effect of within 
group heterogeneity in public goods games. The public goods game is one of the most commonly 
used constructs in experimental economics as it allows investigation into social dilemma situations; 
those where individual and group (social) interests are in conflict.  
Since the various treatments vary according to only a single variable or parameter (i.e. the treatment 
variable); any systematic differences in subjects’ behaviour is therefore attributed to the treatment 
variable. To flesh out an earlier example, in Chapter 2, the difference in behaviour between two of 
the present treatments (a baseline control and a binary reputation mechanism) is attributed solely to 
the presence of a reputation mechanism since everything else is held constant. The random 
assignment of subjects to treatments ensures that any other affective variable is uniformly 
distributed across the treatment groups. As such, the experimental method allows us to analyse a 
particular ceteris parabus effect. 
2 
 
The primary focus of Chapter 2 (“Reputation Mechanisms and the Number of Possible Feedback 
Ratings: A Comparative Experiment”) is an investigation into the effect on reputation mechanisms (of 
the kind featured on websites such as eBay and Amazon) of the range of possible ratings that can be 
given. In particular, the results of an experiment featuring an auction market with multiple buyers and 
sellers are presented. The auction is designed to mirror eBay and Amazon style transactions in the 
sense that the seller can decide, ex-post, to renege on the transaction having already been paid. The 
auction presented in Chapter 2 thus features moral hazard. Two reputation mechanisms are compared 
to a baseline control treatment that featured no reputation mechanism. One treatment featured a 
reputation mechanism with only two possible ratings; 0 and 1. The other featured a total of seven 
possible ratings from 1 to 7. Since there are multiple sellers in each market and the bidders are able to 
see the feedback history, it is hypothesised that bidders are better off when there is a reputation 
mechanism available (since they can avoid bad sellers or at least lower their bids accordingly).  
Since reputation mechanisms are an increasingly important, and salient, feature of online market 
places, it is important to understand the determinants of the efficacy of such mechanisms. Indeed, the 
number of possible feedback ratings is one of the simplest design parameters and as our results show 
it can affect both the behaviour of both buyers and sellers in such markets. As such, it is important that 
care is taken when designing reputation mechanisms. 
The results presented do indeed suggest that in both treatments featuring a reputation mechanism, 
bidders are significantly better off than the baseline control treatment that features no reputation 
mechanism. It is also apparent that sellers respond to the final auction price in deciding whether to 
send the good (and incur the associated cost of doing so, despite having no formal obligation). Further, 
the sellers are more likely to honour the sale when there is a reputation mechanism available. The 
results further suggest that buyers are better off when there are greater number of possible feedback 
ratings available in the sense that they earn higher profits. 
In Chapter 3 (“Sequential Equilibrium and Moral Hazard Auctions”), the notion of different ‘types’ of 
sellers is formalised within the sequential equilibrium framework. In the sequential equilibrium 
framework, reputation emerges as a rational response to the existence of some behavioural type. This 
type typically has some desirable characteristic, such as being able to credibly pre-commit to certain 
actions. This gives rise to incentives to mimic the behavioural type, to gain a reputation for being the 
behavioural type that can be exploited in the final rounds. The particular investigation of Chapter 3 
involves an auction similar to that featured in Chapter 2. To simplify the design the markets featured 
a single seller. A theoretical model of a moral hazard auction with some probability that a given seller 
3 
 
is a ‘good’ seller (in the sense that they always send the good) is developed and a unique equilibrium 
of the one-shot auction is presented. In addition, a sequential equilibrium including a full multi-period 
bidding strategy, Bayesian beliefs and a full seller strategy is derived for the 2 and 3-period version of 
the auction. The chapter contributes to the literature through the extension of the sequential 
equilibrium framework into a multi-player, market-based game such as an auction. This allows a more 
formal analysis of the role of reputation formation in markets as opposed to repeated ‘one on one’ 
interactions.  
An experiment featuring a repeated, multi-period game, i.e. a 3-period game was played 4 times in 
succession, was conducted in which each group of bidders was assigned to a different seller for each 
new 3-period game. Three treatments were conducted that vary according to the nature of the sellers. 
In one baseline, all the sellers are other experimental subjects and thus are making real decisions 
depending on the outcome of the auction and their own cost parameter (i.e. the exact structure used 
in Chapter 2). In the other baseline control, all the sellers’ actions were implemented automatically by 
the computer, always sending the good. This is a canonical private value auction. The novel treatment 
of the experiment featured in Chapter 3 involves half of the sellers being real subjects and half being 
implemented automatically by the computer. In this case, as per the sequential equilibrium logic 
presented in the chapter, the real subjects 
 have incentives to mimic the computer sellers in the first 2 periods of the 3-period game, by sending 
the goods and receiving lower immediate profits, in order to not send the good in the final period. On 
the other hand, if a seller does not send the good then the bidders must know that they are not a 
computer seller and will bid accordingly in the future.  
The results presented suggest that bidders behaviour significantly differently across the three 
treatments. In the novel, sequential equilibrium treatment there is strong evidence that bidders 
reduce their bids after the seller reneges on the contract – something bidders in the baseline featuring 
only real sellers fail to do. Similarly, there is evidence that sellers in the sequential equilibrium 
treatment are willing to renege on the sale but only in the final period of the 3-period blocks. Again, 
this is behaviour that is not exhibited by the sellers in the baseline control treatment. Thus, despite 
some substantial quantitative deviations, there are clear patterns of behaviour that are qualitatively 
consistent with the expected behaviour and equilibrium predictions of the reputation building 
hypothesis.  
In Chapter 4 (“Public Goods Games with Structural Heterogeneities in Endowment and Marginal 
Return”), the results of two Public Goods game are presented. The Public Goods game framework 
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models a social dilemma in which private and social (group) interest are in conflict. The purpose of 
Chapter 4 is to investigate the effect of ex-ante heterogeneities in the initial endowment and the 
marginal return. The chapter was inspired by the empirical observation that in the United Kingdom, 
those with the highest incomes also have the highest rate of acquiring private healthcare and 
educational services (see ONS, 2013, p.10 and IFS, 2010, p.39,46) – suggesting that they have lower 
than average benefits from the provision of these public goods. Thus, in one treatment, the initial 
endowment and marginal return are inversely related such that those with the highest endowment 
have the lowest marginal return. As such there is a conflict between the ability (i.e. the endowment) 
and the incentives (i.e. the marginal return) to contribute to the provision of the public good. In another 
treatment, the initial endowment and marginal return are proportionally related such that those with 
the highest endowment also have the highest marginal return. Further treatments were included for 
control purposes in which there is heterogeneity in only the initial endowment or marginal return. A 
final control treatment features groups that are homogeneous in both initial endowment and marginal 
return. In this first experiment the game is a one-shot encounter. Chapter 4 features an additional 
experiment featuring only the treatments in which both the initial endowment and marginal return 
are heterogeneous being repeated to investigate the dynamics of any potential contribution norms 
that may arise, in addition to the robustness of the one-shot results.  
Interestingly, there are no overall differences between the various treatments conducted. There are, 
however, important and significant within treatment differences, as well as between treatment 
differences at the individual level. The results in the initial, one-shot experiment suggest that subjects 
are responsive to heterogeneities in only the endowment and marginal return (or both). When the 
initial endowment and marginal return were inversely related, the results suggested a conflict of both 
beliefs and behaviour between those with high endowment/low marginal return and those with low 
endowment/high marginal return. The repeated experiment sheds further light on this conflict, 
highlighting the importance of different contribution rules. When the endowment and marginal return 
are inverse, each type contributes on average the same in absolute terms. On the other hand, when 
they are proportional, each type contributes on average the same in relative terms (i.e. contributions 
were proportional to endowment/marginal return). This highlights the crucial importance of 
contribution rules in determining behaviour in such settings. Additionally, there is an analysis of the 
welfare implications of the public goods mechanism by considering the effect on the Gini coefficient 
for each group. In the treatment which has initial endowment and marginal return inversely (or 
negatively) related, the public goods mechanism has a significant, positive effect on inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient (i.e. the level of inequality decreases). On the other hand, when initial 
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endowment and marginal return are proportionally (or positively) related, the mechanism has no 
effect on the pre-existing inequality. 
We now present the three independent chapters outlined above that are thematically tied together 
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We present the results of an experimental auction market featuring seller side moral hazard. 
We compare behaviour in the absence of a reputation mechanism to two alternative reputation 
mechanisms which vary the number of possible feedback ratings that can be given as either 2 
(binary) or 7 (non-binary). In the absence of a reputation mechanism, the market persists to the 
detriment of bidders. The presence of a reputation mechanism makes bids fall rapidly over time. 
This suggests the reputation mechanism facilitates learning by bidders. Prices fall significantly 
quicker when more possible feedback ratings are available (the non-binary case), in direct 
contrast to the theoretical prediction that a greater number of possible feedback ratings 
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2.1 Introduction  
Reputation mechanisms are an increasingly important feature of many websites, and especially of 
those that allow users to conduct peer-to-peer financial transactions, i.e. to buy and sell things directly 
from and to one another. The need for a reputation mechanism arises from the moral hazard implicit 
in such an undertaking. Buyers are often required to pay upfront without a meaningful guarantee that 
the items purchased will be shipped (or the services rendered). Given the variation between sellers, 
such marketplaces also feature adverse selection (in seller quality). The reputation mechanism is 
crucial in overcoming the moral hazard and adverse selection and allowing for the functioning of a 
successful market. The most notable example of such a market is eBay but there are many others. The 
reputation mechanism enables a functioning market by allowing buyers to share their experiences of 
particular sellers with one another. Interestingly, even the clandestine internet marketplace Silk Road 
(which was shut down by the FBI in 2013) features a (non-binary) reputation mechanism. This may 
seem strange, though it is perhaps particularly important on such sites given the other anonymisation 
procedures that are often in place and the corresponding lack of consumer protection. The effect of 
reputation is two-fold; it constrains seller behaviour (overcoming moral hazard) by allowing the 
possibility of credible reductions in future profits (lower/fewer bids)1 and enables bidder learning 
(overcoming adverse selection) about seller quality (i.e. did the good arrive (on time)? Was it as 
described? etc. Also see Cabral (2005)). Reputation mechanisms can be broadly thought of in two 
categories;   
Binary: A binary reputation mechanism allows agents to rate an interaction as either positive or 
negative, often represented as + and -2  (e.g. eBay).  
Non-Binary: A non-binary reputation mechanism allows agents to rate an interaction along a multi-
point Likert scale, common examples are a score out of 5, 7 or 10 (e.g. Amazon).  
The current paper presents the results of an experiment in which we implement a repeated auction 
market featuring seller side moral hazard (the seller does not have to honour the auction contract after 
being paid) and vary 1) whether a reputation mechanism is available or not and 2) the number of 
possible feedback ratings when a reputation mechanism is available. It is important to understand the 
                                                          
1 In a situation in which there is no feedback, only the winning bidder can (attempt to) impose future payoff 
reductions. 
2 Many sites also allow neutral feedback, though evidence suggests this is rarely used; see Resnick and 
Zeckhauser (2002), Dellarocas and Wood (2008) or Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010). 
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effect the total number of feedback ratings has on the use and efficacy of such a mechanism since they 
are an increasingly salient aspect of many online marketplaces.  
Dellarocas (2005) theoretically shows that in the case of non-binary feedback metrics, cooperation 
rates (the rate of honoured contracts) are at least as high when agents treat the metric as though it 
were binary (that is, when agents create a binary partition of the non-binary metric), compared to a 
more nuanced conditional strategy. As such, the number of possible feedback ratings is irrelevant. 
Crucial to this result is that the seller faces a binary decision; to send the good or not. As such, only 
two possible feedback ratings are required to communicate the entire possible action space of the 
seller. The extent of any behavioural differences between the use of a binary or non-binary mechanism 
is little understood and remains an open question in the literature. As such, the current paper seeks to 
provide some insight by presenting experimental evidence of repeated auction markets featuring no 
reputation mechanism, a binary mechanism or a non-binary mechanism.  
Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (2004) conduct an experiment using a repeated trust game with three 
treatments; perfect-strangers, perfect-partners and perfect-strangers with a feedback mechanism. On 
all three measures used by the authors, efficiency, trust and trustworthiness, the treatment with a 
feedback mechanism outperforms the strangers treatment, though it does not do quite as well as the 
partners treatment. It is worth noting that all the feedback used is generated exogenously and 
completely accurately (perfect monitoring) by a computer. It is thus different from the experiment 
presented here in which the ratings given are subjective assessments by the subjects themselves. 
Chen, Hogg and Wozny (2004) implement an experimental auction market with non-binding contracts. 
The experiment consists of three treatments: `low information’ - only history of transactions a player 
was involved in are available, `high information’ - a full transactions history is available to all players 
and `self-reporting’ - following a transaction, players can assign the other party positive or negative 
feedback, and a feedback score is publicly visible. Unsurprisingly, contract fulfilment rates were lowest 
in the `low information’ context (always below 70%). On the other hand, fulfilment rates in the `high 
information’ and `self-reporting’ contexts were similar (above 80% for most periods). This suggests 
that a reputation mechanism can create similar levels of trustworthiness as a high informational 
environment. Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels (2013) present the results of an experimental repeated 
auction market with seller moral hazard and three different reputation mechanisms designed to 
investigate the nature of reciprocal feedback3  and the distortions in reputation information this can 
                                                          
3 This means that sellers can also leave feedback about buyers, something not possible in the experiment 
presented in this paper. 
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create. The authors show that a blind system, in which feedback received cannot be viewed until the 
person has also left feedback, and a Detailed Seller Rating system4  can improve upon a baseline case 
in which feedback is immediately visible.5 The seller’s decision is implemented as a quality scalar. It is 
thus different from the experiment we present in which the seller faces a binary decision, which allows 
us a closer comparison with the theory of Dellarocas (2005).  
It should be noted that a vast empirical literature on reputation in auctions exists examining the effect 
of many different aspects such as; an empirical literature examining the existence of a price premium 
(see Resnick et al (2006), Jin and Kato (2008) or Cabral and Hortaçsu (2010)), quality certification and 
highlighting `top’ sellers (Elfenbein, Fisman and McManus (2014), Nosko and Tadelis (2015)), 
procurement auctions (Brosig-Koch and Heinrich (2014), Spagnolo (2012)), interventions to increase 
giving of feedback when it is not compulsory (Cabral and Li (2015)) and that we discuss in detail only 
those studies most closely related to the current paper. 
We present evidence that, in line with the literature presented above, the presence of a reputation 
mechanism leads to improvements in buyer welfare. In addition, we find that having a greater number 
of possible feedback ratings (i.e. the non-binary case) leads to further improvements in buyer welfare. 
This is important because reputation mechanisms are an increasingly important feature of online 
market places and the number of possible feedback ratings is a fairly basic aspect of the design process 
yet as our results show it can have a significant impact on behaviour.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows; section 2 outlines the experimental design and 
procedures followed, section 3 provides formal hypotheses, section 4 presents the results and section 
5 provides some discussion and concluding remarks.  
2.2 Experimental Design and Procedures  
We first outline the framework environment for the experiment presented in this paper before 
describing in detail the various treatments under consideration and finally the procedures involved.  
                                                          
4 Indeed, eBay now employs a Detailed Seller Rating system on its site that allows the user to, in addition to the 
normal positive/negative feedback, rate the seller along various aspects of the sales process along a five-point 
scale. 
5 The problem being that sellers would immediately leave buyers negative feedback after receiving negative 
feedback for seemingly no reason, discouraging people from leaving negative feedback in the first place and thus 
distorting the reputation information available to future buyers. 
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2.2.1 Framework: The Internet Auction  
All relevant parameters are as used in the experiment presented below. The framework is as follows;  
1. Each player was assigned as either a bidder or a seller and groups were randomly formed of 7 
bidders 𝑖  =   {1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  7} and 3 sellers 𝑗  =   {𝐴,  𝐵,  𝐶}. This role and group remained 
fixed throughout.  
2. Bidders received a valuation 𝑣𝑖,𝑗 ~ 𝑈[5,  10] for 𝑗  =   {𝐴,  𝐵,  𝐶} corresponding to each of the 
three sellers. Valuations are independent between bidders and across sellers. Sellers receive 
a cost 𝑐𝑗 ~ 𝑈[0,  5] associated with sending their good. Costs are independent between sellers. 
All of this is common knowledge.  
3. Bidders submitted simultaneous, sealed bids 𝑏𝑖,𝑗 𝜖[0,  10] ∀ 𝑗  =   {𝐴,  𝐵,  𝐶} for each of the 
goods. The winner and price 𝑃𝑗 were then determined via the second price format.
6 The 
winning bidder then paid the realised price.7  
4. Each seller was informed of the price 𝑃𝑗 for their respective good. Each seller then decided 
whether to ̀ send’ the good (𝑆𝑗   =  1) and incur the associated cost 𝑐𝑗 or to not ̀ send’ the good 
(𝑆𝑗   =  0) which is costless.  
5. Each bidder was informed of the price 𝑃𝑗 and whether they were the winning bidder for each 
good. Only the winning bidder for a particular good is informed of whether the seller `sent’ the 
good or not.8 Each bidder is then informed of their total profit for the round, given as 𝑢𝑖   =
 𝐷𝑖,𝐴(𝑆𝐴𝑣𝑖,𝐴   −  𝑃𝐴)   +  𝐷𝑖,𝐵(𝑆𝐵𝑣𝑖,𝐵  −  𝑃𝐵)   +  𝐷𝑖,𝐶(𝑆𝐶𝑣𝑖,𝐶   −  𝑃𝐶) where 𝐷𝑖,𝑗 is an indicator 
variable indicating whether the bidder won the good (𝐷𝑖,𝑗   =  1) or not (𝐷𝑖,𝑗   =  0). Each seller 
is informed of their profit, given as 𝑢𝑗   =   𝑃𝑗  −   𝑆𝑗𝑐𝑗.  
6. Stages 2-5 are repeated a finite number of times with 𝑇  =  30.  
 
Each subject began the experiment with an initial endowment of 300 ECU (Experimental Currency 
Units) and the valuation and cost parameters described above refer to numbers of ECU.  
                                                          
6 The winner is the bidder who places the highest bid. In the case of a tie each joint highest bidder wins with 
equal probability. The price paid is equal to the highest bid amongst the remaining non-winning bidders. 
7 The second price auction format was used for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is the price format used on 
existing auction websites such as eBay. Secondly, the optimal strategy is not a function of the number of bidders 
(which was either 5, 6 or 7, depending on the number of subjects arriving for the session). Finally, this optimal 
strategy is in general easier to calculate than the first price format which involves bid shading.  
8 This information does not form part of the history available to non-winning bidders. 
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2.2.2 Treatments  
A total of three treatments were conducted. The control treatment (C) is precisely the internet auction 
as described above. The remaining two treatments introduce a binary and a non-binary reputation 
mechanism. The binary treatment (B) has a reputation mechanism in which the winning bidder can 
leave feedback of either 0 or 1, where 0 was interpreted as the worst possible feedback and where 1 
was interpreted as the best possible feedback (this was explicitly told to subjects in the instructions, 
an indicative set of instructions for the NB treatment can be seen in an appendix). This is analogous to 
a situation in which a rating is either negative or positive. The non-binary treatment (NB) has a 
reputation mechanism in which there are 7 possible feedback ratings (the numbers 1 to 7), where 
higher ratings are interpreted as meaning better feedback (again, this was explicitly told to subjects), 
with 1 the worst possible feedback and 7 the best possible feedback. The choice of 7 was motivated 
by two considerations; creating sufficient difference between the binary and non-binary mechanisms 
and also ensuring that the non-binary mechanism had a well-defined midpoint (which rules out, for 
example, the use of a 10-point scale).  
2.2.3 Procedures  
All sessions were conducted at the University of Birmingham. Each treatment was programmed and 
conducted using the zTree software (Fischbacher (2007)) and subjects were recruited using ORSEE 
(Greiner (2004)). A total of 114 subjects were recruited; 40 in the control, 38 in the binary and 35 in 
the non-binary treatment. Each subject took part in only one treatment (session) and thus the design 
was between-subject. Each session consisted of two independent groups for a total of 20 subjects (14 
bidders and 6 sellers). On occasions when 20 subjects were not available, an alternative was 
implemented in which the number of bidders was reduced as appropriate with each group always 
having three sellers. Therefore, in some sessions one or both of the groups consisted of 5 or 6 bidders 
and 3 sellers. A total of two sessions were run per treatment to give four independent matching groups 
per treatment. Subjects were asked to complete a series of control questions to ensure understanding. 






2.3 Hypotheses  
We now present hypotheses, beginning by setting up the null hypothesis as the purely self-interested 
theoretical prediction. We expect, based on the results of the literature discussed above9, to reject the 
null hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 0 (H0): In all treatments and all periods the winning price is zero (that is, 𝑷𝒋,𝒕 =  𝟎 ∀ 𝒋  =
 {𝑨,  𝑩,  𝑪},  𝒕  =   {𝟏,  . . ,  𝑻}) since 𝒃𝒊,𝒋,𝒕   =  𝟎 ∀𝒊,  𝒋,  𝒕. Moreover, conditional on out of equilibrium 
play (Pj, t > 0), the seller will never send the good (S j , t = 0 ∀ j, t). 
The unique weak perfect Bayes equilibrium10 of the game presented above, obtained through 
backwards induction and introducing a time subscript, is S j , t = 0 ∀ j = {A, B, C}, t = {1, .., T} and 
b i , j , t = 0 ∀ i = {1, .., 7}, j = {A, B, C}, t = {1, .., T}. That is, none of the sellers choose to send the good 
in any period and, anticipating this, bidders never choose to place positive bids. This remains the case 
whether a reputation mechanism is available or not (i.e. it is not treatment specific).  
Hypothesis 1B (H1B): In the binary and non-binary treatments bidders are better off in the sense 
that they earn higher profits, compared to the baseline control treatment.  
Hypothesis 1S (H1S): In the binary and non-binary treatments sellers are worse off in the sense that 
they earn lower profits, compared to the baseline control treatment.11 
Together, they represent a replication of the previous results that the opportunity to use a reputation 
mechanism can improve market outcomes for first-movers. As such, we expect not to reject these 
hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 2B (H2B): Bidders are no better off in the non-binary treatment compared to the binary 
treatment, in the sense that profits are not higher in the non-binary treatment than the binary 
treatment.  
                                                          
9 For example, Bolton and Ockenfels (2004) or Chen, Hogg and Wozny (2004). 
10 Uncertainty over other bidders’ valuations, as in all auctions, introduces Bayesian uncertainty though it is trivial 
due to the backwards induction logic. 
11 Note that for given valuation and cost, the total surplus is fixed and an increase in bidder profits will be 
matched with decreased seller profits.  
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Hypothesis 2S (H2S): Sellers are no worse off in the non-binary treatment compared to the binary 
treatment, in the sense that profits are not lower in the non-binary treatment than the binary 
treatment. 
Failure to reject these hypotheses would provide support for the results of Dellarocas (2005) presented 
above. The intuition is as follows; if the feedback metric is integer values from 1 to 7 inclusive, then 
efficiency is at least as high when agents identify a `tipping point’ (formally; a binary partition) above 
which feedback is homogenously good and below which it is homogenously bad, compared to a more 
complex conditional strategy that differentiates (for example) between a feedback score of 6 and 7 
(clearly, this assumes that this is not the location of the binary partition). Given that the seller has a 
binary choice a reputation mechanism with more than a single partition can add no value in terms of 
information transmission since two messages are sufficient to communicate the entire possible action 
space of the seller.  
2.4 Results  
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Results Overview - 
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics on bidding behaviour and the seller decisions for each 
treatment. Figure 2.1 shows the average bid as a proportion of valuation per period for each of the 
three treatments pooled across all three of the sellers’ goods, along with the 95% confidence interval. 
As can be seen there is a notable fall in bids in both the binary and non-binary treatment across the 30 
periods under consideration. It is also worth noting that there is no such decline in the control 
treatment - bids remain high throughout. The average bid across all periods is 6.28 ECU in the control 
treatment, 5.00 ECU in the binary treatment and 4.02 ECU in the non-binary treatment.12 Across all 
three treatments, the average bid is positive in all periods. The proportion of all bids equal to zero, the 
prediction of the self-interested null hypothesis (H0), is 11.03% in the control treatment, 20.21% in the 
binary treatment and 24.97% in the non-binary treatment.13 
 
 
                                                          
12 The average valuation is essentially constant across treatments (7.48, 7.48 and 7.53 respectively across the 
control, binary and non-binary treatments. 
13 278/2520, 473/2340 and 517/2070 in the control, binary and non-binary treatments respectively. 
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Figure 2.1: Average bid as a proportion of value across all thirty periods by treatment. 95% 
confidence intervals are also shown.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows firstly the distribution of (integer rounded) prices across all three treatments and the 
frequency with which the good was sent, conditional on each price interval. The most noticeable 
aspect is the differing distribution of prices, which is commensurate with the analysis on bidding 
behaviour presented above. As can be seen, there is a clear pattern that the good is sent more 
frequently as the price increases, across all three treatments. The average propensity for the good to 
be sent across all periods and goods is 0.57 in the control treatment, 0.54 in the binary treatment and 
0.58 in the non-binary treatment. In all three treatments, the average propensity for the good to be 
sent was positive in all periods. On this basis (Figures 2.1 and 2.2) the null hypothesis (H0) that bidders 
would not bid having anticipated that sellers would not send the good is overwhelmingly rejected for 
all treatments. 
We now analyse our alternative hypotheses. Average bidder profit per period is negative in all three 
treatments (-0.45 ECU per period in the control; -0.35 and -0.20 ECU in the binary and non-binary 
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treatments, respectively14), such that on average bidders end the experiment with less than their initial 
endowment. This is indicative of the moral hazard present in the market. Nonetheless, winning bidders 
earn significantly higher profits (i.e. lower losses) in the non-binary treatment compared to the control 
(Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: p=0.0833).15 There is no difference in bidder profit between the binary and 
control treatment, however (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: p=0.1489). The non-binary treatment also 
leads to significantly higher bidder profit compared to the binary treatment (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: 
p=0.0833).  
Figure 2.2: Frequency of transactions in which the seller sent the good according to the 
distribution of prices across each treatment. 
 
Note: the price has been rounded to the nearest integer value. 
Average seller profit was, of course, positive in all treatments (6.97 ECU per period in the control; 5.79 
and 4.86 ECU in the binary and non-binary treatments, respectively) since sellers do not face any moral 
                                                          
14 This corresponds to -3.15, -2.27 and -1.17 ECU on average per winning bidder across the three treatments. 
15 In all cases, N=8 (i.e. there are four independent observations (markets) per treatment). Unless otherwise 
stated, all tests are two-tailed.  
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hazard.16 The seller profit is significantly higher in the control treatment than the binary (Mann-
Whitney Rank Sum: p=0.0833) and the non-binary treatment (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: p=0.0209). 
There is no difference in seller profit, however, between the binary and non-binary treatment (Mann-
Whitney Rank Sum: p=0.1489). We can now state our results.  
Result 1: Bidder profit is not significantly different between the control treatment and the binary 
treatment. Bidder profit is significantly higher in the non-binary treatment than both the control 
treatment and the binary treatment.  
Result 2: Seller profit is significantly lower in both the binary and non-binary treatment than in the 
control treatment. Seller profit is not significantly different between the binary and the non-binary 
treatment.  
2.4.2 Bidder Behaviour  
Table 2.1: Distribution of Ratings Across the Binary and Non-Binary Treatments. 
Binary Non-Binary 
Rating Frequency Rating Frequency 
0 210 (57) 1 199 (62) 
  2 11 (9) 
3 5 (5) 
4 21 (17) 
5 17 (17) 
6 26 (26) 
1 150 (139) 7 81 (78) 
Note: The distribution of ratings given by winning bidders for both the non-binary and binary treatment. The 
numbers in parenthesis are the distribution of ratings conditional on the seller sending the good. 
 
We now turn to analyse actual decisions to find the underlying mechanism for these results. We begin 
by investigating differences in bidder behaviour across treatments. The average bid as a proportion of 
                                                          
16 As discussed below, sellers can incur losses when the price is below the cost of sending the good and the seller 
chooses to send the good. 
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a subject’s valuation is 0.84 (0.83 excluding the first five periods17) in the control, 0.67 (0.64) in the 
binary treatment and 0.54 (0.48) in the non-binary treatment. Only the control and the non-binary 
treatment are significantly different (z=1.732, p=0.0833). The proportion of zero bids is significantly 
higher in the non-binary than the binary treatment (p<0.0118), and significantly higher in the binary 
than the control treatment. Conversely, the amount of overbidding is significantly higher in the control 
(30.87%) than in the binary (22.56%) treatment (p<0.01), and in the binary than the non-binary 
(11.74%19) treatment (p<0.01).  
We now consider the use of the reputation mechanism available in the binary and non-binary 
treatments. The average rating in the binary treatment was 0.416 and in the non-binary treatment was 
3.13. Conditional on the good being received the average rating is 0.709 and 4.50 and conditional on 
the good not being received the average rating is 0.07 and 1.21, in the binary and non-binary 
treatments, respectively. Table 2.1 shows the distribution of ratings given in each treatment across all 
periods and also provides a breakdown conditional on whether the good was received or not. Figure 
2.3 displays this information visually. As can be seen, the modal choice in the binary treatment was 0 
and in the non-binary treatment was 1. Thus, in both cases the lowest possible feedback rating was 
the modal choice. The ratings given are also conditioned on whether the good was sent or not, with 
the majority of lowest possible ratings being given after the good not sent and the (vast) majority of 
highest possible ratings coming after the good was sent. There is therefore evidence that the bidders 
use the reputation mechanism in a manner that is broadly to be expected - higher ratings are given 
more frequently when the good is received and vice versa. Nonetheless, there are some instances in 
which, for example, a rating of 7 is given in the non-binary treatment following the good not being 
received. It is difficult to explain such behaviour. There are also instances in which, for example, a rating 
of 1 was given in the non-binary treatment following the good being received. This behaviour is 
particularly interesting. It may, of course, simply be a misunderstanding of the reputation mechanism 
as in the previous example. From a post-experimental questionnaire, however, another explanation 
arises. Two bidders (one each in the binary and non-binary) explicitly stated they gave low ratings to 
dissuade other bidders from bidding in the future.20 Thus, while most use of the reputation mechanism 
is as would be expected, there are some notable instances in which that is not the case. 
                                                          
17 Excluding the first five periods allows for a rating history to be built up consisting of five previous transactions 
and increases familiarity with the environment. 
18 Test for equality of proportions, see an appendix for the exact methodology.  
19 778/2250, 528/2340 and 243/2070 in the control, binary and non-binary treatments, respectively. 
20 For example, a subject in the non-binary treatment stated “i tended to give feedback of 1 to put other buyers 
off” (sic).  
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To more directly compare rating behaviour across the binary and non-binary treatments the ratings 
given in the non-binary treatment were transformed on the [0,1] line.21 The difference between the 
correspondingly adjusted ratings is not significant (p=0.1450). Furthermore, the rating in neither the 
binary nor the non-binary treatment exhibits a significant time trend (p=0.1780 and p=0.2196, 
respectively). Thus, we fail to reject the hypothesis that the bidders in the binary and non-binary 
treatments use the reputation mechanisms available in a similar fashion. This is consistent with the 
fact that the sizeable majority of ratings in the non-binary treatment are at the extreme; either 1 or 7. 
As mentioned above, empirical observations of existing reputation mechanisms observe a notable `J’-
shaped curve (i.e. the highest and lowest possible ratings are most common. See Hu, Pavlou and Zhang 
(2009)). Similar to these observations, we find the vast majority of feedback in the non-binary 
treatment to be at the extremes of either 1 or 7 (as per Figure 2.3). Different to the existing literature, 
however, we witness a backwards `J’-shaped curve, with the most frequent feedback being given as 1 
followed by 7 in the non-binary treatment. This is, however, consistent with the observation that trust 
does not pay off in this market and is therefore not totally unexpected.  
 
Table 2.2 presents the results of a Tobit regression22 with the subject’s bid as the dependent variable. 
Standard errors are clustered at the independent matching group level and presented in parenthesis. 
There is a significant treatment effect on bidding behaviour, as can be seen from the treatment dummy 
variables included in the regression. In both the binary and non-binary case the effect is negative and 
the effect is significantly greater in the non-binary case (F-test, p=0.065). We also include an interaction 
between these treatment dummies and the rating given to the particular seller in the previous period. 
The coefficient on the previous rating is positive and significant for both the binary and non-binary 
treatments, suggesting higher previous ratings are associated with higher bids, as would be expected 
and indeed is confirmed by the above descriptive statistics. We also include a number of additional 
controls for robustness. Valuation has a positive and significant effect on bidding behaviour which is 
not surprising. There is also positive serial correlation as can be seen by the significant coefficient on 
the previous bid (one period lagged dependent variable). We also include a linear time trend which is 
significant and negative, though of small magnitude. To control for the effect of being the winner of 
the particular seller’s good in the previous period, we include a dummy indicating whether the bidder 
was the winning bidder in the previous period. This has a large, negative effect on bidding behaviour 
                                                          
21 By taking the rating from 1 to 7, subtracting 1 and dividing by 6.  
 
22 Random Effects GLS Regression are included in an appendix as a robustness check.  
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that is highly significant. This is consistent with the above observation regarding negative bidder 
profits. Finally, to analyse the effect of the seller sending the good, we include an interaction between 
whether the bidder was the winning bidder and a dummy indicating whether the seller sent the good 
or not. The effect is significant and positive though the overall effect of being the winning bidder and 
receiving the good remains negative (F-test, p=0.0004). It is also worth noting that the results 
presented here are robust to instead running the regression `good-wise’ (i.e. for each seller’s good 
independently). There is therefore evidence of a (negative) bidder treatment effect, and furthermore 
there is evidence that this effect is stronger in the non-binary than the binary treatment.  
Figure 2.3: The distribution of ratings given across the binary and non-binary treatment.  
 








Table 2.2: Bidding Behaviour Regression Results. 
Estimation Technique Tobit 
Dependent Variable Bid 
Treatment = Binary -0.858** (0.368) 
Treatment = Non-Binary -1.601*** (0.461) 
Treatment = Binary * Previous Rating 0.893*** (0.116) 
Treatment = Non-Binary * Previous Rating 0.221*** (0.051) 
Value 0.681*** (0.065) 
Previous Bid 0.802*** (0.052) 
Previous Winning Bidder -2.172*** (0.143) 
Previous Winning Bidder * Previous Sent 1.276*** (0.232) 
Period -0.040*** (0.007) 
Constant -3.170*** (0.670) 
Observations 6468 
Log-Likelihood -13, 537.9 
Note: Tobit regression with the bid as the dependent variable. Regression is censored on 
the available bidding space. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the independent 
matching group (N=12) and are presented in parenthesis.  
2.4.3 Seller Behaviour  
In this section, we analyse in detail sellers’ decisions regarding whether to send the good or not. We 
begin by presenting summary statistics. As can be seen in Table 2.4, there is little difference across the 
three treatments and indeed none of the differences are significant when using non-parametric 
statistics. In all treatments (and indeed, in all matching groups) there is a drop in the frequency with 
which the good was sent between the periods 1-15 and periods 16-30. One interesting aspect is the 
seller behaviour when a sale is potentially unprofitable i.e. the winning price is below the seller’s cost 
of sending. Given the persistence of high prices in the control treatment, there are no potentially 
unprofitable sales. In the treatments with a reputation mechanism (and falling prices), though, it is a 
relatively frequent occurrence, happening in 38/360 and 37/360 transactions in the binary and non-
binary treatments, respectively (i.e. approximately 10% of all auctions in the binary and non-binary 
treatment had a winning price below the seller’s cost to send the good). That the seller still sends the 
good in 4/38 and 5/37 transaction, respectively, we take as evidence of a form of `pure’ reputation 
building. When the price is above 5, the seller is effectively choosing between a high and a low (but 
still positive) level of profit, however when the price is below 5 the seller may be choosing between a 
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positive and a negative level of profit. Indeed, some sellers explicitly refer to attempts to gain 
reputation by sending the good at a loss in a post-experimental questionnaire (available in 
supplementary material on request).  
Table 2.3: Seller Behaviour Regression Result.  
Estimation Technique Probit 
Dependent Variable Send 
Treatment = Binary 1.122*** (0.428) 
Treatment = Non-Binary 2.059*** (0.337) 
Treatment = Binary * Previous Rating 0.024 (0.277) 
Treatment = Non-Binary * Previous Rating -0.062 (0.056) 
Price 0.341*** (0.044) 
Treatment = Binary * Price -0.116* (0.062) 
Treatment = Non-Binary * Price -0.179*** (0.065) 
Cost -0.538*** (0.065) 
Previous Send 0.586* (0.326) 
Period -0.022*** (0.007) 
Constant -1.191*** (0.311) 
Observations (Clusters) 1012 (12) 
Log Pseudolikelihood -476.39 
Note: Probit Regression on Seller Behaviour. Standard errors are clustered at the level of 
the independent matching group (N=12) and presented in parenthesis.  
 
Table 2.4: Send Frequency by Periods for each Treatment. 
Treatment Periods 1 – 15 Periods 16 – 30 
Control 117/180 (65%) 87/180 (48.33%) 
Binary 128/180 (71.11%) 68/180 (37.78%) 
Non-Binary 122/180 (67.78%) 88/180 (48.89%) 
Note: Overview of sellers’ decisions to send the good or not for each treatment. The 
table also provides a breakdown for periods 1-15 and 16-30.  
 
Table 2.3 presents the results of a Probit regression with standard errors clustered at the level of the 
independent matching group. Both treatments have a positive and significant effect impact on the 
likelihood of the seller sending the good. In addition, the non-binary treatment haws a significantly 
greater effect than the binary treatment (F-test, p=0.015). We also include the rating that the seller 
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received in the previous period (interacted with the treatment dummies). In neither the binary nor the 
non-binary treatment is this effect significant - this suggests that the despite the existence of an overall 
treatment effect, the actual rating received does not have a significant impact on seller behaviour. To 
see the varying effect of the winning price across the three treatments the specification includes not 
only the winning price, but also interactions between the winning price and the treatment dummies. 
It can therefore be seen that increases in the winning price have a positive and significant effect on 
the probability that the seller will send the good. It should however be noted that this effect is stronger 
in the control treatment than both the binary and non-binary treatment, though the binary and non-
binary treatments do not have different effects. This suggests that the winning price is more important 
in determining seller behaviour in the control than the treatments involving a reputation mechanism. 
Finally, we also include a number of additional controls; the cost of sending the good has a negative 
and significant effect, there is an overall negative time trend and the seller is more likely to send the 
good if they sent the good in the previous period. Our results are thus robust to the inclusion of several 
control variables, all of which have the expected sign. The evidence presented here therefore suggests 
that a (positive) seller treatment effect exists in both the binary and non-binary treatment, and further 
that this effect is stronger in the non-binary than the binary treatment. Interestingly, the actual rating 
the seller received in the previous period is not significant.  
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion  
We present evidence that replicates the existing results that the presence of a reputation mechanism 
can lead to improvements in buyer welfare when there is seller moral hazard. In both treatments with 
a reputation mechanism, bids are lower and the frequency with which the good was sent are higher 
(once price has been controlled for) than in the control treatment where no reputation feedback is 
provided. In all cases the market fails to function properly due to the existence of moral hazard, as on 
average bidders receive negative profits.  
The results presented in this paper suggest that having more possible feedback ratings leads to 
improvements in buyer (`consumer’) welfare, even when the seller’s decision is binary (send or not 
send). It is important to note that the intuition of Dellarocas (2005) relies heavily on the fact that the 
seller has only two possible actions - if the seller only has two possible actions then two messages (i.e. 
a binary mechanism) are sufficient to create a one-to-one mapping from the action space to the 
message space. In other words, it is not clear from a theoretical point of view why allowing more 
feedback ratings is beneficial and this remains an open theoretical question posed by the results 
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presented here. This is compounded by the fact that the actual rating received in the previous period 
is not significant in determining seller behaviour. Nonetheless, we find evidence that suggests more 
possible feedback ratings will lead to improvements in consumer welfare in a market featuring moral 
hazard on the seller side. Regression analysis suggests that this effect operates on both the bidders 
(who decrease their bids) and sellers (who increase the probability that they will send the good). One 
plausible explanation for this is that it is easier for bidders to see a deterioration in feedback ratings 
that range from 1-7 (i.e. initially high ratings (5/6/7) being replaced by low ratings (1/2/3)) than in the 
case where feedback is binary (i.e. initially high proportion of 1’s being replaced by a high proportion 
of 0’s) that means it takes bidders in the binary treatment longer to figure out the auctions are, on 
average, unprofitable. This is potentially surprising given that in the environment under consideration 
any reputation effect should operate through constraining seller behaviour and not through bidder 
learning (which would indicate adverse selection not formally present in the experiment presented in 
this paper). 
In reality, the seller’s decision has multiple dimensions (stated vs delivered quality, `customer service’, 
Postage and Packaging quality/speed). This is the inspiration behind the `Detailed Seller Rating’ system 
employed on Ebay (given the increasing prevalence of such systems there are numerous other 
examples), in which the seller is rated independently on multiple aspects of the sales process. 
Nonetheless, the results presented here suggest the number of possible ratings that can be given can 
have significant effects on both buyer and seller behaviour in a rich marketplace consisting of multiple 
buyers and sellers. As such, when implementing such reputation mechanism systems, careful 
consideration should be given to one of the seemingly most simple design decisions - the number of 
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Appendix 2.A: Experimental Instructions 
Economic Decision Making Experiment - Instructions 
Welcome to the Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEEL). This is an experiment in 
decision making. The University of Birmingham has provided the funding for this research. It is very 
important that you read the instructions carefully.  
 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, 
or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you 
talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and 
appreciate your following of these rules. 
 
We will firstly go over the instructions together. You will then have a chance to ask clarifying 
questions. Each of you will then answer a few questions to make sure everybody understands.  
You will be given an initial endowment of 300 ECU. You will be paid according to the number of ECUs 
you have at the end of the experiment. You will be paid according to following exchange rate; 
𝟏 𝑬𝑪𝑼 =  𝟑𝒑 
In addition to this initial endowment, you have already earned a £2.50 show up fee. We would like to 
stress that any decision you make is completely anonymous. You will be paid privately in cash at the 
end of experiment. 
Introduction 
During this experiment, you will be a member of a group. A group consists of 10 subjects. In addition 
to being a member of a group, you will also be assigned a role. Your role will either be bidder or 
seller. Each group will contain exactly 7 bidders and 3 sellers. You will remain in the same role and 
group throughout the experiment. Once the experiment begins, you will be informed of your role. A 




Once everyone has been informed of their role, there will be 30 periods. A round consists of three 
stages; the bidding stage, the seller stage and the feedback stage. We shall now go through each 
stage in detail.  
The Bidding Stage 
During the bidding stage, each bidder will have the opportunity to place a bid on a fictional good 
belonging to each of the three sellers. The sellers are randomly denoted as A, B and C.  Each bidder 
will have an independent valuation for each of the three goods, which is between 5 and 10. Bidders 
must then decide how which they wish to bid for each of the three items. Bidders input their choices 
on the following screen; 
The winning bidder is the bidder who places the highest bid. If there is a tie (two equal highest bids), 
then the winner is determined randomly. The price the winning bidder must pay is equal to the 
second highest bid. The winning bidder then pays the winning price.  
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In all rounds after the first round, you will be to see a history of what has happened in previous 
rounds, before making a decision to bid. You will be shown this information as follows; 
 
The history box contains the following information; 
Period - The current period 
Your profit - The profit you received in that period 
Total profit - Total profit from all past periods including the 300 ECU endowment 
Price A - The winning price for good A 
Feedback A - The feedback given to seller A by the winning bidder 
Price B - The winning price for good B 
Feedback B - The feedback given to seller B by the winning bidder 
Price C - The winning price for good C 
Feedback C - The feedback given to seller C by the winning bidder 
 




The Seller Stage 
Once the bidding stage is over, the seller stage begins. Each of the sellers will be given an 
independent cost, between 0 and 5. The seller will also be informed of the winning price for their 
respective good. Therefore, seller A is told the winning price for good A, and so on. Each seller must 
then decide whether they wish to 'send' the good, or whether they wish to 'not send' the good. If the 
seller chooses to 'send' the good, they will be charged their cost for doing so. Not sending the good 
costs nothing.  
After the first period, sellers will also have a history box available to them. Each seller will make their 
decision on a screen that looks like this; 
 
The history box for the seller contains the following information; 
Period - The current period 
Your profit - The profit you received in that period 
Total profit - Total profit from all past periods including the 300 ECU endowment 
Price - The winning price for the seller's good 
Send - Displays whether the seller sent the good in previous periods 






In between the seller stage and the feedback stage profits for the round are calculated. The profit is 
























The Feedback Stage 
The feedback stage is divided into two sub-stages; bidder feedback and seller feedback. 
 
A bidder can only make profit if they were the highest bidder for a specific auction. If a bidder is 
not the highest bidder in any auction, then they receive profit of zero for this round. If the bidder 
was the highest bidder for any of the three items, the profit per item is as follows; 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒     if the seller sent the good 
−𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒    if the seller did not send the good 
Note that the profit for the highest bidder negative if the seller does not send the good.  The 
winning bid is still paid but the good is not received.  Total profit is then given as the summation 
of any profit earned in each of the three auctions.  
Bankruptcy 
Since it is possible for a bidder to receive negative profit, a bidder may end up with no ECU left. In 
this case, the bidder is declared bankrupt and will take no further part in experiment and will only 
receive the show up fee of X. 
 
 
A seller can only make a profit if there are any positive bids. If no bidder decides to place a bid, 
then the seller receives zero profit for the round. If there are positive bids placed, then the profit 
for the seller is; 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡  if the seller chose to send the good 




Once all of the sellers have made their decision, bidders are shown the outcome of the auction.  
For each of the three goods, bidders are informed of whether they were the highest bidder. All 
bidders are then shown the winning price in the particular auction.  Bidders are reminded of their 
valuations. On the right hand side, the profit received for the particular auction is displayed, 
calculated as described above. The screen will look as follows; 
 
 
If the bidder was the highest bidder for a particular auction, they will also see whether the seller sent 
the good or not. In addition, they will have the opportunity to leave feedback about the seller.  
 
Total profit for the period, across all three auctions, is displayed at the bottom.  
Seller Feedback 
Once all decisions regarding feedback have been made, sellers are shown the outcome for this 
period.  
A seller is given a breakdown of their profit for the period. This includes the winning price for the 
good, the cost of sending and whether the seller sent the good or not. The seller profit is then 
calculated, as described above. The seller is then informed of the feedback rating given to them in 
that period. The screen will look as follows; 
Feedback is given along a 7-point scale. That is, a bidder can leave feedback of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7.  
 
1 is the worst possible feedback rating, indicating the worst transaction possible.  
7 is the best possible feedback rating, indicating the best transaction possible.  
In future periods, all the feedback left to a particular seller by all the previous winning bidders 












This concludes a period of the experiment. The experiment will end once the final period is 
completed. Does anybody have any questions? Please raise your hand and an experimenter will 
come and answer your question. Please do not ask questions out loud.  
 
If nobody has any further questions, you will be asked to fill out a series of questions to ensure 
everybody understands the instructions. You will then be asked to make your decisions for the 
experiment. You will then be asked to fill out a short questionnaire; you do not have to answer any of 




1. Suppose you have been assigned the role of bidder. Will this change throughout the experiment? 
................. 
2. Will you change groups throughout the experiment? ............................................... 
Imagine the following scenario. Bidder 1 is the highest bidder. Bidder 2 did not win the auction. The 
price is 7. Bidder 1 has a value of 5.96 and bidder 2 has a value of 6.54. The Seller did not send the 
good. The Seller cost was 3.14. 
3. What is the profit for Bidder 1? ............................... 
4. What is the profit for  Bidder 2?................................ 
5. What is the profit for the Seller?.............................. 
Now imagine the following scenario. Bidder 1 is the highest bidder. Bidder 2 did not win the auction. 
The price is 7. Bidder 1 has a value of 5.96 and bidder 2 has a value of 6.54. The Seller did send the 
good. The Seller cost was 3.14. 
6. What is the profit for Bidder 1? ............................... 
7. What is the profit for  Bidder 2?................................ 






2.B: Appendix: Tests for the Equality of Proportions  
We test the equality of proportions using the following test;  














, where 𝑁𝑖 is the size of subsample i. 𝑝𝑐 is an estimate of the population 
proportion under the assumed null hypothesis of the equality of proportions. 𝑆𝑝𝑐 is then an estimate 
of the standard error of 𝑝1 − 𝑝2.  
Proportion of Zero Bids  
Control vs Non-Binary  




= 0.1732 and therefore;  















Control vs Binary  




= 0.1545 and therefore;  















Non-Binary vs Binary  




= 0.2245 and therefore;  
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Proportion of Overbidding  
Define overbidding (Bid > Value) as a positive outcome.  
Control vs Non-Binary  




= 0.2224 and therefore;  















Control vs Binary  




= 0.2687 and therefore;  















Non-Binary vs Binary  




= 0.1748 and therefore;  


















2.C: Appendix: Additional Regression Analysis 
Table C.1: Bidding Behaviour Regression Results. 
Estimation Technique Random Effects GLS 
Dependent Variable Bid 
Treatment = Binary -1.001*** (0.073) 
Treatment = Non-Binary -0.538*** (0.063) 
Treatment = Binary * Previous Rating 0.162*** (0.037) 
Treatment = Non-Binary * Previous Rating 0.397*      (0.241) 
Value 0.602*** (0.028) 
Previous Bid 0.647*** (0.017) 
Previous Winning Bidder -1.847*** (0.183) 
Previous Sent 0.626*** (0.083) 
Previous Winning Bidder * Previous Sent 0.697*** (0.239) 
Constant -2.451*** (0.184) 
Observations 6699 
Note: GLS regression clustering on the period (29 clusters). Robust standard errors are 
presented in parentheses.  
 
Table C.2: Bidding Behaviour Regression Results. 
Estimation Technique Random Effects GLS 
Dependent Variable Bid 
Treatment = Binary -0.978*** (0.265) 
Treatment = Non-Binary -0.525*     (0.279) 
Treatment = Binary * Previous Rating 0.165*** (0.057) 
Treatment = Non-Binary * Previous Rating 0.411*     (0.211) 
Value 0.605*** (0.062) 
Previous Bid 0.658*** (0.026) 
Previous Winning Bidder -1.891*** (0.116) 
Previous Sent 0.679*** (0.102) 
Previous Winning Bidder * Previous Sent 0.695*** (0.182) 
Constant -2.560*** (0.452) 
Observations 6699 
Note: GLS regression clustering on the MG (12 clusters). Robust standard errors are 








We present the results of an experiment that implements the sequential equilibrium framework, 
where the stage game is a moral hazard auction in which the seller can choose not to send the 
good. We introduce a commitment type seller who always sends the good (overcoming the 
moral hazard) with some prior probability. We find that as the prior probability on this 
commitment type increases, bidders on average place higher bids, as predicted by a theoretical 
model we develop. We also find limited evidence that sellers respond to the presence of the 
commitment type by increasing the probability with which they send the good in early periods, 
consistent with the canonical sequential equilibrium literature in which agents attempt to mimic 
existing commitment types. As with much of the literature of sequential equilibrium, there is 
significant quantitative deviation from equilibrium. Nonetheless, we find patterns of behaviour 
that are broadly consistent with the qualitative features of such a model of reputation formation 
and conclude that sequential equilibrium (adverse selection) reputation effects remain an 




JEL CODES: C73, C92, D02, D44, D82 
Keywords: Reputation, Auction, Markets, Repeated Games, Sequential Equilibrium, Adverse Selection  
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3.1 Introduction and Objectives  
Reputation is a pervasive phenomenon of interest to researchers in many varied fields including, but 
not limited to, computer science, psychology, marketing and economics. A wide range of agents seek 
to gain reputation which is supposed to have long term benefits. From skilled tradesmen who wish to 
build a reputation for not being `cowboys’, to expert consultants who wish to form a reputation for 
giving good advice, many individuals seek to acquire reputation for being or doing certain things. 
Reputation is also important when using peer-to-peer internet markets, such as eBay. In the latter 
case, reputation enables the proper functioning of a market that would otherwise break down in its 
absence, due to the presence of moral hazard.  
The present paper seeks to extend the existing literature on the sequential equilibrium (hereafter SE; 
the model is outlined in detail in Section 3.2) model of reputation formation by introducing group 
dynamics in the form of an auction market with seller side moral hazard. The stage game that is 
repeated in the sequential equilibrium model is typically a two-player two-stage game. The current 
paper seeks to extend the literature by incorporating the Bayesian uncertainty of the SE model to 
multi-player market-based games. In particular, we implement a commitment type seller that will 
always send the good in a moral hazard auction (i.e. if matched against the commitment type seller, 
there is no moral hazard present). It is important to understand how the dynamics of reputation 
formation witnessed in canonical SE games extend to market-based institutions such as auctions.  
The results of an experiment are presented that implements a moral hazard auction and varies the 
existence of a commitment type seller that always sends the good. Bidders are uncertain as to the type 
of the seller (whether they are committed or free-to-choose) they are currently matched with. We 
present results that suggest both bidders and sellers respond to the reputational considerations 
present, even despite the competition amongst bidders. Bidders, on average, bid higher amounts 
when the prior probability of the commitment type increases. Sellers choose to send the good with 
higher probabilities on average when the commitment type can theoretically exist. The model 
presented here can thus be seen as either extending the canonical SE framework (in a trust game 
setting) to incorporate group competition amongst the trustors (first-movers) or as extending an 
auction featuring seller side moral hazard to the SE setting. The results presented here extend the 
existing literature by suggesting that reputational considerations do continue to play a role in market-
based games that feature Bayesian uncertainty about the distribution of types of agents.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. This section concludes with a literature review providing 
motivation for the experiment presented. A theory section outlines the theoretical (and experimental) 
construct used throughout the paper, highlighting equilibrium predictions and hypotheses. We next 
outline in detail the experimental design and procedure before proceeding to present the results. 
Finally, a concluding section features an overview and discussion of the results presented throughout 
the paper.  
3.2 Literature and Motivation  
Within economics a primary paradigm for understanding reputation is the sequential equilibrium 
model of strategic reputation formation due to Kreps and Wilson (hereafter KW, 1982) and Milgrom 
and Roberts (MR, 1982). The idea is that a phenomenon of strategic reputation formation may emerge 
in a theoretical environment of repeated interaction23, where otherwise it would not, if agents 
entertain the possibility of different behavioural types and are uncertain as to the type of the agent 
they are matched with. Strategic reputation formation may then see a rational agent mimicking a 
particular behavioural type to gain a reputation, for being of that type, that can be exploited for future 
benefit sufficient to offset the initial (opportunity) costs of acquiring reputation. The SE reputation 
model therefore explicitly posits the strategic reputation formation process as a response to the 
prevailing behavioural heterogeneities of a given environment. Many of these behavioural types can 
be rationalised by and correspond to either pro- or anti-social preferences. The SE model can thus be 
seen as an attempt to formalise the prevailing behavioural heterogeneities of a given environment.  
The sequential equilibrium (SE) model of reputation formation stems from the seminal papers of KW 
and MR, in response to the Chain-Store paradox presented by Selten (1978). The Chain-Store paradox 
involves the impossibility of intuitive reputation building equilibria in finite multi-period, two-player 
stage games due to the backwards induction logic. SE solves this paradox by doing two things; 
introducing a behavioural (or commitment) type and relaxing the assumption of common knowledge. 
The behavioural type is committed to the action that allows the agent to acquire reputation - in 
practice this is, therefore, often the Stackelberg action24. The realisation of an agent’s type is private 
information. In this case, each agent engages in a Bayesian updating process as to the type of other 
agents whenever new information is received. Thus, rational agents may have an incentive to mimic 
the induced behavioural type to raise others’ beliefs that they are of the behavioural type. These 
                                                          
23 Not necessarily between the same agents, if a history of past play is available. 
24 The action to which the agent would themselves commit, were they able to do so credibly. 
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beliefs can then be exploited as the final periods approach and the strategic value of acquiring and/or 
maintaining reputation falls. SE provides a quantifiably testable theory of the formation of reputation 
by a long-run agent (the monopolist) in repeated strategic interaction under uncertainty. It is also a 
solution concept that can be extended beyond the Chain-Store paradox to situations involving 
repeated interaction, past reporting and uncertainty over behavioural types. Experimental evidence 
seeks to test directly whether behaviour is consistent with a Bayesian updating process given the initial 
parameterisation of the model and the history of play up to the current round.  
The model has been extended to many varied theoretical settings such as a repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson 1982), a bargaining model (Abreu and Gul (2000)), cheap 
talk (Brandts and Figueras (2003)) and the trust game (Anderhub, Engelmann and Güth (hereafter AEG) 
2002). In addition, many experiments have been conducted seeking to test the validity of the 
quantifiable predictions made by the SE model. The first such experiments were by Camerer and 
Weigelt (1988), Neral and Ochs (1992), Andreoni and Miller (1993) and Jung, Kagel and Levine (1994). 
Whilst patterns broadly consistent with reputation formation are often found, there is still significant 
deviation from the prediction of SE including but certainly not limited to a lack of Bayesian updating. 
For example, the experimental findings for Camerer and Weigelt (1988) are qualitatively consistent 
with the SE prediction, though there is significant under-reneging. Pooled data on lending decisions 
are also broadly consistent with the predictions of SE. Nonetheless, the authors still report significant 
under reneging and conclude that an appeal to homemade priors25 can only partially account for 
deviation from the predictions of SE.  
More recently, Brandts and Figueras (2003) show that SE has greater predictive power when the 
equilibrium is in pure as opposed to mixed strategies. This is fairly intuitive since in previous 
experiments, the SE often involved multiple periods of monotonically increasing (or decreasing, game 
dependent) mixed strategies which can be cognitively difficult to employ. Embrey, Frechette and 
Lehrer (2011) implement the Abreu and Gul (2000) SE extension of the Rubinstein bargaining model. 
They find significant evidence for the mimicking of obstinate (or stubborn) bargainers. Interestingly, 
the authors find the emergence of a `complementary’ type who immediately accommodates the 
obstinate bargainer’s demand26  - something SE is simply unable to account for. As with the other 
                                                          
25 This refers to pre-existing beliefs the subjects may hold about the proportion of subjects who will behave in a 
particular way, independent of the implementation of commitment types.  
26 In other words, when splitting a pie of size 30, a sizeable proportion of people make an initial demand of only 
10 when a commitment type who will not accept less than 20 exists with some probability. Agents should not 
concede to give the other person 20 until they are sufficiently convinced they are facing an obstinate bargainer 
and not just a person copying one. 
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experiments described, there are nonetheless significant deviations from the SE prediction. Grosskopf 
and Sarin (2010) incorporate `bad’ reputation models such as Ely and Valimaki (2003) by introducing 
uncertainty about a state of nature, known only to the agent seeking reputation, that determines the 
optimal course of action. They also vary whether reputation can be acquired or not. They find that 
reputation need not be as beneficial nor as harmful as previously thought. AEG extend the literature 
further by explicitly allowing the use of mixed strategy play which SE frequently predicts. Nonetheless, 
they still find significant deviation from the SE prediction in a repeated trust game setting.  
The two most closely related papers are AEG and Bolton, Greiner and Ockenfels (2013, hereafter BGO). 
AEG implement a repeated trust game with incomplete information (regarding the type of the second 
mover). The authors vary the sequential equilibrium prediction by varying the length of each repeated 
game. The key differences between AEG and the experiment presented here are that the auction 
introduces competition amongst bidders (first-movers; analogously `trustees’) and that bidders have 
a continuous and unrestricted action space27  whereas AEG implement a binary trust game such that 
the second mover has only two options; to be `trustworthy’ or not. Conversely, BGO implement a 
repeated auction market with seller moral hazard (a similar construct can be seen in Hogg, Chen and 
Wozny (2004) and Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (2004)). They vary the type of available feedback and 
analyse the efficacy of the various feedback mechanisms in overcoming the moral hazard. The key 
differences between the environment in BGO and the one presented here is that in BGO the seller 
chooses a quality scalar whereas we have a binary choice for the seller and that BGO does not include 
any commitment types and thus (formalised) behavioural uncertainty.  
3.3 Theory and Hypotheses 
3.3.1 The Model: A Commitment Moral Hazard Auction  
1. Nature chooses a type for the seller denoted s. With probability 𝜇0 the seller is a commitment 
type and with the complementary probability 1 − 𝜇0 the seller is a rational (free to choose) 
type. This is private information belonging to the seller and is not known by the bidders 
denoted 𝑖 = {1, … , 𝑁}.  
2. Bidders receive valuations 𝑣𝑖,𝑡~ 𝑈[𝑉, 𝑉] and the seller receives a cost 𝑐𝑠,𝑡~𝑈[0, 𝑉]. 
3. Bidders place simultaneous sealed bids 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 ∈ [0, ∞].  
                                                          
27 Bidders are prevented from bidding above the upper support on the value (10 ECU). 
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4. The winner is the bidder such that 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 > 𝑏𝑗,𝑡 ∀ 𝑖 ≠. If some bidders tie for the highest bid, 
then each is selected with equal probability to the winner. Denote the winning bidder 𝑖  as 
𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = 1 and all other bidders 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 as 𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = 0. 
5. The price is determined as 𝑃𝑡 = max
𝑊𝑖,𝑡=0
𝑏𝑖,𝑡 (i.e., the second highest bid) which the winning 
bidder pays.  
6. The seller then decides whether to send the good (denoted 𝐷𝑠,𝑡 = 1) or not (𝐷𝑠,𝑡 = 0). 𝛾 
denotes a mixed strategy and refers to the probability of sending the good. Sending the good 
incurs cost 𝑐𝑠,𝑡 and not sending the good incurs cost 0.  
7. Bidder profit is defined as 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖,𝑡(𝐷𝑠,𝑡𝑣𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡) and seller profit is defined as 𝑢𝑠,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡 −
𝐷𝑠,𝑡𝑐𝑠,𝑡. 
8. Stages 2-7 are repeated for 𝑇 =  {1, … , 𝑇} periods.  
 
It is interesting at this point to analyse the limiting cases of the prior probability. When the prior 
probability 𝜇0 is zero, the environment is a pure moral hazard auction similar to BGO. When the prior 
probability is 1, the environment described above collapses to a repeated canonical second price 
auction. For intermediate priors, this environment represents an auction analogue of the environment 
typically described in the sequential equilibrium reputation literature (most closely, the trust game 
used in AEG). As such, the environment described here advances on the existing literature by 
introducing competitive group dynamics (i.e. an auction) in an environment of multi-period Bayesian 
uncertainty. The key focus of the current paper is thus to extend the insights of the literature regarding 
reputation formation in two player games of incomplete information to multi-player market-based 
games also featuring incomplete information.  
3.3.2 Solving for Reputation Equilibria  
The sequential equilibrium reputation approach would see a single bidder choose a bidding path which 
makes the seller just indifferent between `not sending’ in the penultimate period (and then also in the 
last period) and `sending’ then `not sending’ in the final two periods. The seller then chooses the 
strategy that `induces their own indifference’ i.e. the strategy for which the bidders’ best response is 
the strategy that makes the seller indifferent. The bidder is then playing a best response and the seller, 
being indifferent, is best responding too. This logic is not possible in the construct presented here for 
a simple reason; the competition amongst bidders. Bidders are unable to coordinate on the bidding 
vector that generates seller indifference due to the competitive forces of the auction. Bidders instead 
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bid their expected values and the seller then unilaterally maximises profits (this logic can be especially 
seen in the two-period game, below). Despite the breakdown of the canonical reputation logic, we are 
nonetheless able to find reputation equilibria in which the free to choose seller chooses to send the 
good (or, in the language of sequential equilibrium, mimic the commitment type) in all but the final 
period (see the two- and three- period games, below).  
The One-Shot Commitment Moral Hazard Auction 
Suppose 𝑇 = 1. It is clear that the seller choosing 𝛾𝑠,1 = 0 is the unique sequentially rational strategy. 
Thus, in any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium the seller chooses 𝐷𝑠,1 = 0 with probability 1. Consider ex-
ante symmetric bidders who bid according to 𝐸(𝑢𝑖,𝑡)28. This implies that all bidders 𝑖 = {1, … , 𝑁} will 
play the same ex-ante bidding strategy 𝑏𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑗,𝑡  ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 and win with equal probability  
1
𝑁
  giving 𝑃1 =
𝑏𝑖,1 ∀ 𝑖. Consider then a bidder who faces a choice between a bid of b i , 1 and not bidding which earns 
nothing. The winning bidder will earn ex-ante expected profit given by29; 
 
𝑢𝑖,1
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝜇0(𝑣𝑖,1 − 𝑏𝑖.1) + (1 −  𝜇0)[𝛾𝑠,1(𝑣𝑖,1 − 𝑏𝑖.1) − (1 − 𝛾𝑠,1)𝑏𝑖,1] (𝟑. 𝟏) 
 
where 𝛾𝑠,1 is the probability (strictly the bidder belief about the probability – initial beliefs are assumed 
to be correct and are updated using Bayes rule thereafter) that the rational type seller sends the good, 
which as above is 0 when 𝑇 = 1. Simplification gives;  
 
𝑢𝑖,1
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝜇0𝑣𝑖,1 − 𝑏𝑖,1 (𝟑. 𝟐) 
 
Thus, a positive bid requires;  
 
𝜇0𝑣𝑖,1 ≥ 𝑏𝑖,1 (𝟑. 𝟑) 
                                                          
28 This corresponds to the optimal bidding function in a canonical second price auction. The same logic, that there 
is no 'penalty' to bidding your value (c.f. a first price auction) still holds. It is thus assumed that bidders are risk-
neutral. 




Therefore, Equation 3.3 tells us that the optimal bid is capped from above by 𝜇0𝑣𝑖,1. The auction logic 
pushes Equation 3.3 to equality, at which point each bidder is indifferent between bidding 𝜇0𝑣𝑖,1 and 
not bidding. The unique Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the commitment internet auction described 
above is characterised by 𝑏𝑖,1 = 𝜇0𝑣𝑖,1∀ 𝑖 and 𝛾𝑠,1 = 0. We also require that bidder beliefs are correct, 
i.e. B i , 1 = γs , 1 = 0 where B is the bidder belief but since no Bayesian updating is required in the one-
shot game this can trivially be satisfied.  
For 𝑇 = 1, the unique ex-ante symmetric bidding strategy, for any value of 𝛾1, is given by 𝑏𝑖,1 =
(𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1)𝑣𝑖,1. The proof is in two parts; first we prove that no bidder will deviate from this 
equilibrium strategy and second we prove that no other bid represents an equilibrium bidding strategy.  
Consider a bidder who wishes to deviate when all other bidders bid the stated equilibrium bidding 
strategy. 𝑏𝑖,1 > (𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1)𝑣𝑖,1 guarantees that bidder 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 is the winning bidder since 𝑏𝑗,1 =
(𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1)𝑣𝑗,1∀ 𝑗, however it also ensures zero ex-ante
30 expected profit and thus there is 
nonetheless no strong incentive to deviate. Consider 𝑏𝑖,1 < (𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1)𝑣𝑖,1, then the bidder 𝑖 
does not win the auction with probability 1 and receives zero profit, and thus has no strong incentive 
to deviate from the stated equilibrium strategy. Therefore, no bidder has a strong incentive to deviate 
from the stated equilibrium strategy.  
Suppose now an alternate symmetric equilibrium strategy 𝑏𝑖,1′. Suppose 𝑏𝑖,1′ > (𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1)𝑣𝑖,1, 
then all bidders receive negative ex-ante expected profit. Suppose 𝑏𝑖,1′ < (𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1)𝑣𝑖,1, then 
all bidders receive positive ex-ante expected profit, however every bidder has an incentive for an small 
increase in their bid 𝑏𝑖,𝑡, which would mean that they win for sure and receive positive ex-ante 
expected profit since 𝑃1 = max
𝑊𝑗,𝑡=0
𝑏𝑗,𝑡 ′ < (𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1)𝑣𝑖,1. Iterative logic then shows that 𝑏𝑖,1 =
(𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1)𝑣𝑖,1 is the unique ex-ante symmetric bidding strategy. As above, for 𝑇 = 1 and since 
𝛾𝑠,1 = 0, the unique symmetric bidding strategy is given by 𝑏𝑖,1 = 𝜇0𝑣𝑖,1.  
Consider the limit as 𝜇0 → 0. The environment collapses to a situation in which no commitment type 
sellers exist. All sellers will not send the good, and knowing this no bidder places a positive bid, as can 
be seen in Equation 3. This is of course the unique equilibrium described in the case where no 
commitment type exists31. Consider the limit as 𝜇0 → 1. The environment collapses to a canonical 
                                                          
30 Note that, ex-ante, all subjects have the same valuation. 
31 In this case, positive bids require trust in the seller. 
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second price auction and according to both Equation 3 and canonical theory bidders should bid their 
valuations 𝑏𝑖,1 = 𝑣𝑖,1. Thus, both limiting cases of the prior probability are consistent with existing 
theory.  
The Twice-Repeated Commitment Moral Hazard Auction  
Consider now the case in which 𝑇 = 2. In the twice repeated game, the second period outcome is the 
equilibrium of the one-shot game; 𝛾𝑠,2 = 0 and 𝑏𝑖,2 = (𝜇1 + 𝛾𝑠,2 − 𝜇1𝛾𝑠,2)𝑣𝑖,2 with 𝛾𝑠,2 = 0.  
In this case, beliefs are updating using Bayes’ rule whenever new information becomes available (i.e. 
after seeing whether the seller sends the good or not) where;  
𝜇1 = {
𝜇0
(1 − 𝜇0)𝛾1 + 𝜇0
                         𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑
0                                      𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑
} 
Consider the first period bidding behaviour and acknowledge that 𝛾𝑠,2 = 0. The ex-ante expected 
profit for bidder 𝑖 is given by;  
 
𝑢𝑖,1 = 𝜇0[(𝑣 − 𝑏𝑖,1) + (𝑣 − 𝑏𝑖,2)] + (1 − 𝜇0)[𝛾1[(𝑣 − 𝑏𝑖,1) − 𝑏𝑖,2] − (1 − 𝛾1)𝑏𝑖,1] (𝟑. 𝟒) 
 
Solving in the same manner as the one period game (above);  
 
[2𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1 +
(𝜇0𝛾1 − 𝜇0 − 𝛾1)𝜇0
(1 − 𝜇0)𝛾1 + 𝜇0
] 𝑣 ≥ 𝑏𝑖,1 (𝟑. 𝟓) 
 
In a similar fashion to the one period game, Equation 3.5 sets an upper limit on the first period bid as 
a function of 𝜇0 and 𝛾1. A similar logic to that stated above pushes Equation 3.5 to equality.  
Thus for 𝑇 = 2, the optimal bidding strategy is given by [2𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1 +
(𝜇0𝛾1−𝜇0−𝛾1)𝜇0
(1−𝜇0)𝛾1+𝜇0
] 𝑣 = 𝑏𝑖,1 
and 𝜇1𝑣 = 𝑏𝑖,2. Note that this states the optimal bidding strategy for any 𝛾1. This has an important 
implication: the seller can unilaterally choose 𝛾1 to maximise their profit, considering the effect of 𝛾1 
on the optimal bidding strategy. Thus, all that remains to characterise Perfect Bayesian equilibria of 
the two-period game is to determine 𝛾1. In particular, we wish to consider 1 ≥ 𝛾1 > 0.  
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The seller profit function is given by;  
𝑢𝑠 = (𝑃1 − 𝛾1𝑐𝑠,1) + 𝛾1(𝑃2 − 𝛾2𝑐𝑠,2) 
where 𝛾2 = 0, 𝑃1 = max
𝑊𝑗,𝑡=0
𝑏𝑗,𝑡 = [2𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1 +
(𝜇0𝛾1−𝜇0−𝛾1)𝜇0
(1−𝜇0)𝛾1+𝜇0
] 𝑣 and 𝑃2 = 𝜇1𝑣. 
 
Table 3.1: Unique Symmetric Equilibrium for the Twice Repeated Game for 𝒗 = 𝟏𝟎, 𝒄 = 𝟓 and 
𝝁𝟎 = 𝟎. 𝟓 
Period Prior/Posterior Seller Strategy Bidder Strategy 
1 𝜇0 𝛾𝑠,1 = 1 𝑏𝑖,1 = 𝑣 
2 𝜇0 𝛾𝑠,2 = 0 𝑏𝑖,2 = 𝜇0𝑣 
 
Figure 3.1: Simulation Results for the Optimal Seller Strategy in the Twice Repeated Game 
 
Note: The figure presents, for each integer value of the cost (i.e. for multiple cost-to-value ratios) with v = 10 
and 𝜇0 = 0.5. 
 
A numerical simulation was run at this point to obtain the optimal (i.e. profit maximising) strategy for 
the seller i.e. the optimal probability of sending the good in the first period. The problem was solved 
by calculating first the optimal bidder strategy, for all possible values of the seller’s first period decision 
(allowed to be a mixed strategy with up to 2 significant figures) and consistent with a history in which 
the good is received in the first period, as described above. Finally, seller profit is calculated as 
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described above, for all possible values of the seller’s own decision. From here, finding the optimal 
value is a simple search problem since, as above, the seller is able to unilaterally maximise their own 
profit. The parameterisation was such that 𝑣 = 10 and μ0 = 0.5. The results of the simulation, for 
various values of the cost parameter are presented in Figure 3.1. As can be seen, for the majority of 
`low’ costs, the profit maximising choice for the seller is to send the good for certain during the first 
period. Unsurprisingly, as the cost approaches the value (and the ex-ante gains from trade disappear 
altogether), the optimal choice becomes strictly interior. Even in the case where the price is 10 and 
the cost is 9, the seller sends the good with positive probability. As in the canonical sequential 
equilibrium logic, the seller mimics the computerised seller with positive probability. 
The Three Period Commitment Moral Hazard Auction  
For 𝑇 = 3, the optimal bidding strategy conditional on receiving the goods in periods 1 and 2 is; 𝑏𝑖,1 
given by Equation 3.6, 𝑏𝑖,2 given by Equation 3.7 and 𝑏𝑖,3 given by Equation 3.8, obtained using the 
same logic and intuition as above, iterated (backwards) another period. 𝜇𝑖  is updated using Bayes’ rule 
where possible and in the case of not receiving the good, the posterior becomes zero and bidders do 
not bid positively again.  
 
[3𝜇0 + 𝛾1 − 𝜇0𝛾1 + 𝛾1𝛾2 − 𝜇0𝛾1𝛾2]𝑣 + [𝜇0𝛾1 − 𝛾1 − 𝜇0]𝑏𝑖,2 + [𝜇0𝛾1𝛾2 − 𝛾1𝛾2 − 𝜇0]𝑏𝑖,3
= 𝑏𝑖,1 (𝟑. 𝟔)
 
 
[2𝜇0 + 𝛾2 − 𝜇0𝛾2]𝑣 + [𝜇0𝛾2 − 𝛾2 − 𝜇0]𝑏𝑖,3 = 𝑏𝑖,2 (𝟑. 𝟕) 
 
𝜇2𝑣 = 𝑏𝑖,3 (𝟑. 𝟖) 
 
As an example, suppose 𝜇0 = 0.5, 𝑣 = 10 and 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 1. Also, 𝛾3 = 0 by the logic of the one-shot 
game. Notice first that 𝜇0 = 𝜇1 = 𝜇2 = 0.5 by Bayes’ rule and  hence 𝑏𝑖,3 = 5. Substitution then 
gives 𝑏𝑖,2 = 10 and 𝑏𝑖,1 = 10. Therefore, in this example, the optimal bidding vector
32 is given by (𝑏𝑖,1,
𝑏𝑖,2, 𝑏𝑖,3)   =   (10,  10,  5). As another example, suppose 𝜇0 = 0.5, 𝑣 = 10 and 𝛾1 = 1 as before but 
                                                          
32 Consistent with only realisations of the good being sent - not receiving the good unambiguously reveals the 
normal sellers type and results in off-the-equilibrium path bids of zero everywhere. 
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now that 𝛾2 = 0.5 with  𝛾3 = 0 as before. In this case 𝜇0 = 𝜇1 = 0.5 and 𝜇2 = 0.67 the optimal 
bidding vector defined by Equation 3.6, Equation 3.7 and Equation 3.8 is given by (𝑏𝑖,1, 𝑏𝑖,2, 𝑏𝑖,3)   =
 (10, 7.5,  6.7). It is important to note that these bidding vectors are conditional upon the history in 
which in the good is always received.  
The sellers expected profit function is given by Equation 3.9 where 𝑃𝑡   =   𝑏𝑖,𝑡 by the ex-ante symmetry 
of the bidders. Suppose also now that 𝑐 = 𝑣 = 5. 
 
𝑢𝑠 = 𝑃1 + 𝛾1(𝑃2 − 𝑐1) + 𝛾1𝛾2(𝑃3 − 𝑐2) (𝟑. 𝟗) 
 
Since the competitive logic of the auction determines the optimal bidding strategy completely as a 
function of 𝜸 = (𝛾𝑠,1, 𝛾𝑠,2, 𝛾𝑠,3) (as opposed to generating seller indifference (see above)), the seller is 
able to unilaterally maximise their profit, taking account of the optimal bidding strategy. For the 
parameters 𝜇0 = 0.5, 𝑣 = 10 and 𝑐 = 5, this is achieved by choosing 𝛾1 = 𝛾2 = 1, again obtained via 
simulation, the results of which can be seen in Figure 2 which presents the results of a simulation of 
all possible seller strategies (combination of first and second period actions).  
Thus, for 𝜇0   =  0.5, 𝑣   =  10 and 𝑐  = 𝑣 =  5, an ex-ante reputation equilibrium of the three-period 
game exists in which;  
 Free-to-choose sellers send the good with probability 1 in periods 1 and 2 (𝛾1   =   𝛾2   =  1) and 
with probability 0 in period 3 (𝛾3   =  0). Commitment sellers, of course, send the good with 
probability 1 in all three periods.  
 Bidders bid their expected valuation in periods 1 and 2 and reduce their expected valuation by 
the prior probability in period 333.  
o Conditional upon off-the-equilibrium path play (the good not being received in periods 
1 or 2), the bidders cease to bid and set 𝑏𝑖,𝑡+1 =  0 thereafter.  
 Bidder beliefs are updating using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.  
 
                                                          
33 In this case, the prior probability is equal to the posterior probability since the free-to-choose seller sends the 
good with probability one in the first two periods, preventing any Bayesian updating.  
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Figure 3.2: Simulation Results for the Optimal Seller Strategy in the Thrice Repeated Game  
 
Note: Since the seller strategy now varies in two dimensions (γ1and γ2) the figure displays the resulting level 
of seller profit for 𝑐  = 𝑣 =  5 only. As above, 𝑣   =  10 and 𝜇0 =  0.5.  
 
Table 3.2: Unique Symmetric Equilibrium for the Thrice Repeated Game for 𝒗 = 𝟏𝟎, 𝒄 = 𝟓 and 
𝝁𝟎 = 𝟎. 𝟓 
Period Prior/Posterior Seller Strategy Bidder Strategy 
1 𝜇0 𝛾𝑠,1 = 1 𝑏𝑖,1 = 𝑣 
2 𝜇0 𝛾𝑠,2 = 1 𝑏𝑖,2 = 𝑣 
3 𝜇0 𝛾𝑠,3 = 0 𝑏𝑖,3 = 𝜇0𝑣 
 
We now present hypotheses derived directly from this theoretical construct that correspond to the 
parameters used in the experimental design presented below.  
3.3.3 Predictions and Hypotheses  
We now present hypotheses relating to the various possible values of the prior probability.  
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Hypothesis 1: (Prior Probability = 0) When the prior probability is equal to zero, the prediction is that 
sellers will never send the good with any positive probability and, anticipating this, bidders never place 
positive bids (obtained through the backwards induction logic).  
We now state a hypothesis relating to our experimental parameters. 
Hypothesis 2: (1 > Prior Probability > 0) For our experimental parameters 𝜇0   =  0.5, 𝑣   =  10 and 
𝑐  = 𝑣 =  5, the prediction is as stated above; (real) sellers send the good with probability one in all 
but the final period. Bidders bid their value in the first and second period, and multiple their value by 
the prior probability in the final period, anticipating that real sellers do not send the good. Bidders bid 
their value multiplied by the prior probability because the seller sends the good with probability one 
in the first and second period (as can be seen in Figures 3.1 and 3.2), preventing any Bayesian updating.  
Hypothesis 3: (Prior Probability = 1) When the prior probability is one, canonical auction theory 
(Krishna 2001) predicts that bidders should bid their values.  
3.4 Methodology and Experimental Design  
3.4.1 Experimental Design  
A total of three treatments were conducted. Commitment types are implemented as a computerised 
seller. The balance between computerised and free-to-choose (hereafter real) sellers was varied 
between treatments. The computerised seller always sends the good with probability 1. The first 
treatment contains only real sellers and corresponds to a prior probability of 0 (referred to as P0). The 
second treatment has two computerised and two real sellers corresponding to a prior probability of 
0.5 (P0.5). The final treatment contained only computerised sellers and corresponds to a prior 
probability of 1 (P1). Therefore, P0 is equivalent to a pure moral hazard auction as in BGO and P1 
corresponds to a canonical second price auction (see above regarding the limiting cases of the prior).  
The experimental design closely mirrors the model outlined above. In particular, 𝑣  =  7.5 (uniformly 
distributed between 5 and 10) and 𝑐  =  2.5 (uniformly distributed between 0 and 5) for all treatments. 
𝜇0   =  0 in P0, 𝜇0 =  0.5 in P0.5 and 𝜇0   =  1 in P1. Each value and cost is independent and identically 
distributed between subjects and periods. The value and cost parameters were chosen to ensure a 
pure strategy equilibrium prediction and the prior probability for P0.5 was chosen to provide maximum 
variation to both the other treatments that represent limiting cases. Each session consists of 12 bidders 
and 4 sellers (albeit possibly computerised). The bidders are matched into four groups of three that 
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remain fixed throughout the experiment. Each group of bidders is then matched to one of the four 
sellers. Bidders receive valuations between 5 and 10 ECU (Experimental Currency Units) and sellers 
receive a cost between 0 and 5 ECU. Bidders place sealed bids and the winner is determined by the 
second price format. The seller receives the payment from the winning bidder and then decides 
whether to send the good or not. Sellers are explicitly able to play mixed strategies using a random 
device into which they enter the probability with which they would like to send the good. All 
participants are then informed of the winning price for the auction, whether the seller sent the good 
or not and their profit for the period. After 3 periods have been played, each group of bidders is then 
matched to a new seller and plays another 3 periods of the auction described. Each three-period 
repeated game is referred to as a block. This process continues until each seller has been matched with 
each group of bidders, for a total of 12 rounds (3 periods x 4 blocks). In treatment P0.5, participants 
are explicitly informed that they will meet two real and two computerised sellers across the four 
blocks34. In all treatments, whilst sellers were making their decisions, bidders were asked the 
probability with which they thought the seller would send the good. This was done in an unincentivised 
manner. This was done to avoid income effects that may arise due to subjects gaining income from the 
belief elicitation that could affect bidding behaviour35. All of the above is common knowledge. The 
independent observation is technically the session, of which there are three per treatment. The nature 
of the rematching means that each of the four groups of (three) bidders in a given session faces a 
unique order of either real or computerised sellers.  
3.4.2 Procedure  
All sessions were run at the Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEEL) in May 2014. A 
total of three sessions were conducted for each treatment. Table 3.3 gives a breakdown of the 
numbers of subjects for each session and treatment. The average session lasted 75 minutes and 
subjects received on average £12. All subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004) and came 
from a variety of disciplines from across the University of Birmingham. The experiment was 
programmed using zTree (Fischbacher 2007). Instructions were read aloud to all subjects. Subjects 
were then required to answer control questions to ensure understanding. Finally, at the end of the 
                                                          
34 This induces a super-game in which if sellers unambiguously reveal their type, bidders may be certain that 
they are matched with a computerised seller. Unfortunately, small samples prevent any meaningful analysis of 
this phenomena in the current paper.  
35 We did not want bidders to attempt to gain income solely or predominantly through an incentivised belief 
component of the experiment. 
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session, subjects were asked to conduct a post experimental questionnaire to elicit demographic 
information that can be used for control purposes.  
Table 3.3: Treatment Table showing the number of participants per treatment 
 Per Session  
Treatment Bidders Real Sellers Computer 
Sellers 
Participants Sessions Total 
Participants 
P0 12 4 0 16 3 48 
P0.5 12 2 2 14 3 42 
P1 12 0 4 12 3 36 
3.5 Results and Analysis  
3.5.1 Bidders  
Table 3.4: Bidder summary statistics for each treatment. 
 Bid as Proportion of Valuation (BPV) 
Treatment P0 P0.5 P1 
Period 1 0.75 0.67 0.95 
Period 2 0.78 0.72 0.95 
Period 3 0.75 0.76 0.95 
Total 0.76 0.72 0.95 
Note: The data is pooled across all 3-period blocks. 
 
Table 3.4 shows the mean BPV across all 3-period blocks for each treatment. We refer to the 
proportion of the valuation bid as the BPV (Bid as Proportion of Value). The BPV is not significantly 
different between treatments P0 and P0.5 (Mann-Whitney Rank-Sum; p=0.468). The BPV in both P0 
and P0.5 is however significantly different from the BPV in P1 (p<0.002 and p<0.005 respectively)36. 
Across all three treatments the BPV and the belief are positively correlated (Pearson correlation 
coefficient r=0.45, p<0.000). In addition, across all three treatments the average BPV is larger than the 
average belief. This difference is larger in the P0 treatment (0.25) than the P0.5 treatment (0.12). This 
                                                          
36 Beliefs are only weakly different between treatments P0 and P0.5 (p=0.074) and both P0 and P0.5 are 
significantly different from P1 (p<0.000 and p<0.002 respectively). 
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suggests on average bidders bid above their expected value of receiving the good. We take this as 
being consistent with evidence on overbidding in auctions.  
Table 3.5: Conditional Summary Statistics for Treatments P0 and P0.5. 
Variable BPV – P0 BPV – P0.5 
Condition Real, Sent Real, Not Sent Computer Real, Sent Real, Not Sent 
Period 1 0.84 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.66 
Period 2 0.85 0.72 0.77 0.79 0.45 
Period 3 0.79 0.72 0.83 0.75 0.46 
Total 0.83 0.72 0.77 0.74 0.52 
Note: The table presents the mean BPV for treatment P0 and P0.5, categorised according to whether matched 
with a computer or a real seller, and if real whether the good was received in the previous period.  
Figure 3.3: Average BPV for each Round and for every Treatment. 
 
Note: P0.5 is subcategorised according to whether the group of bidders were currently matched with a 




Table 3.5 shows a conditional breakdown of P0 and P0.5. It gives the mean BPV when matched against 
a computer seller (in P0.5 only) and when matched against a real seller having previously received the 
good or not. There is no significant difference between being matched against a computer compared 
to a real seller having previously received the good (Wilcoxon matched pairs signed rank; p<0.480) in 
treatment P0.5. Of course, the bidders do not know who they are matched against and can only 
condition on whether the good was sent. Both being matched with a computer and a real seller 
conditional on having received the good in the previous period are significantly different from a real 
seller having not previously received the good (p=0.033 and p=0.041 respectively). Also note that in 
the first period after being rematched there is no difference between whether the good was sent or 
not which we would expect since in the previous period the bidders were with a different seller. There 
is thus evidence that suggests bidders do indeed condition on whether they received the good in the 
previous period or not in the P0.5 treatment - when that information is relevant (i.e. in the second or 
third period). This difference between whether the good was previously sent is considerably smaller 
for the P0 treatment. Figure 3.3 shows the mean BPV for each period of each block by treatment. It 
also confirms the results of the non-parametric tests presented above; only in P1 is the BPV different 
from the other treatments.  
Table 3.6 shows two Tobit regressions for the bidding behaviour with the bid as the dependent 
variable. Specification I has treatment dummies, the value, belief, previous bid and whether the good 
was previously sent. All coefficients are significant at the 5% level. The treatment dummies for P0.5 
and P1 are both positive and significant and consistent with the non-parametric statistics and Figure 
3.3. The coefficient on the value and belief are both positive and statistically significant as would be 
expected. Previous period bid, the lagged dependent variable, is positive and significant suggesting the 
presence of autocorrelation in bidding behaviour which is not surprising. We also include interactions 
between the previous period bid and the treatment dummies. In both cases the coefficient is negative 
and significant. We run an additional specification II in which we include also whether the good was 
sent in the previous period. All coefficients maintain their sign, magnitude and significance. As 







Table 3.6: Tobit regression with the bid as the dependent variable.  
Estimation Technique Tobit 
Dependent Variable Bid 
Specification I II 
P0.5 1.381*** (0.513) 1.229*** (0.513) 
P1 2.315*** (0.810) 1.983*** (0.818) 
Value 0.794*** (0.047) 0.790*** (0.047) 
Belief 0.032*** (0.004) 0.031*** (0.004) 
Previous Bid 0.655*** (0.057) 0.659*** (0.055) 
Previous Bid * P0.5 -0.338*** (0.082) -0.352*** (0.081) 
Previous Bid * P1 -0.394*** (0.111) -0.396*** (0.110) 
Previous Sent - 0.698*** (0.215) 
Constant -5.542*** (0.463) -5.848*** (0.455) 
Pseudo R^2 0.133 0.136 
N 1188 
Note: Robust standard errors are clustered on each individual 3 period block and are presented in parenthesis. 
The regression is censored on a lower limit of 0 and an upper limit of 10. 
 
 Result 1B: Bidders respond to the different distribution of seller types across the P0 
and P0.5 treatments in a manner broadly supportive of the reputation building 
hypothesis presented above. Nonetheless, there is significant quantitative deviation 
from equilibrium.  
Support: While the non-parametric statistics presented suggest there is no significant difference in 
bidding behaviour between P0 and P0.5, this masks some important differences between the two 
treatments. The regression results presented in Table 3.6 show a significant and positive treatment 
effect for the P0.5 treatment compared to the P0 baseline. Furthermore, there is evidence that in the 
P0.5 treatment bidders condition on whether they received the good in the previous period or not 
whereas there is little evidence that this occurs in the P0 treatment. We also see from the regression 
presented that the previous period bid has a smaller effect in the P0.5 treatment than the P0 






Figure 3.4: Average BPV and Belief per Period for all Treatments 
 
Note: P0.5 is subcategorised according to whether the group of bidders were currently matched with a 
computer or real seller. The data is pooled across all 3-period blocks. 
 
 Result 2B: Bidders bid higher, on average, in treatment P1 than either P0 or P0.5.  
Support: Non-parametric tests show a significant difference in the BPV between P1 and both P0.5 and 
P0. Table 3.6 shows a significant treatment effect for both P0.5 and P1 compared to P0. We also see 
that in P1 the value has a greater effect than for P0 and P0.5. Furthermore, the equilibrium prediction 
that bidders bid their valuation in the P1 treatment is on average not rejected, as can be seen from 
Table 3.3 where on average in P1 bidders bid 95% of their value.  
3.5.2 Sellers  
Table 3.7 presents summary statistics for the average probability that the seller chooses to send the 
good with for each period and for each treatment. This information can also be seen in Figure 3.5. The 




Table 3.7: Seller summary statistics for treatments P0 and P0.5. 
Variable Probability of Sending the Good 
Treatment P0 P0.5 
Period 1 41.77 66.67 
Period 2 46.58 75 
Period 3 38.33 27.08 
Total 42.23 56.25 
Note: The send probability is the choice variable of the seller and can take values between 0 and 100 inclusive. 
 
Table 3.8 shows results of Tobit regressions  on the send probability chosen by the seller. We begin 
with a simple specification I which includes the winning price, the seller’s cost, a dummy for the final 
period of a matching block (i.e. before being rematched or the experiment ending), a linear time trend 
and a treatment dummy. Specification I shows a significant and positive (as expected) treatment effect. 
All other coefficients have the expected sign; the cost has a negative and significant effect, as does 
being in the final period of a given block. Interestingly, the price is not significant, though the 
coefficient is positive. Specification II includes two interaction terms; one between the treatment 
dummy and the dummy for the final period within a block and another between the treatment dummy 
and the period. Again, the results are robust across estimation techniques and overall period have a 
significant, negative effect. However, in specification II there is no significant overall treatment effect. 
Instead, any treatment effect is entirely captured by the two interaction terms. In the absence of the 
commitment types (P0), there is no significant effect of being in the final period of a block but there is 
a significant, negative effect in the presence of commitment types. Indeed, this effect can be seen 
visually in Figure 3.5 and in Table 3.7 where the send probability in period 3 is significantly lower than 
in periods 1 or 2, for treatment P0.5 only. This is taken as supportive of the reputation building 
hypothesis outlined above. The effect of the overall period is also interesting. In specification I, the 
period has a small significant negative effect. In specification II, the coefficient on the interaction term 
is significant and positive (indicating the probability a seller sends the good in P0.5 increases 
throughout the four blocks), whereas the coefficient on the overall period (capturing such an effect 





Figure 3.5: Average Send Probability and Theoretical Prediction for P0 and P0.5 
 
Note: The vertical lines represent the start of a new block of 3 rounds.  
 
 Result 1S: Sellers behave differently in treatment P0 compared to P0.5 in a manner 
broadly supportive of the reputation building hypothesis.  
Support: First, consider the extent of equilibrium play. For P0, the equilibrium prediction was zero send 
probability in every period. This was the strategy used in 10 of the 48 blocks conducted. In treatment 
P0.5, the equilibrium strategy was send with probability one in periods 1 and 2 and probability zero in 
period 3. This was the strategy used by the seller in 11 out of 24 blocks. Thus, in treatment P0.5, roughly 
half of seller behaviour is consistent with the equilibrium prediction highlighted above. In neither P0 
nor P0.5 is the equilibrium prediction in mixed strategies. Nonetheless, sellers are able to play mixed 
strategies. In P0, of 144 decisions a mixed strategy was employed on 19 occasions. Of the 72 decisions 
in P0.5, a mixed strategy was used only once. Despite finding only weakly significant difference via 
non-parametric tests, regression analysis shows some significant differences between the two 
treatments. As Table 3.8 shows, the direction of the ceteris parabus time trend is different between 
61 
 
the two treatments. In addition, the effect of being in the final period of a block is only significant for 
the P0.5 treatment and suggests that the sellers respond to the reputational considerations created in 
P0.5.  
Table 3.8: Tobit Regression with the send probability as dependent variable 
Estimation Technique Tobit 
Dependent Variable Send Probability 
Specification I II 
P0.5 14.86*** (0.015) -0.784 (0.950) 
Price 2.20 (0.133) 2.55* (0.073) 
Cost -13.88*** (0.000) -13.91*** (0.000) 
Final Period of Block -18.42*** (0.006) -7.08 (0.362) 
Final Period of Block * P0.5 - -34.35*** (0.013) 
Period -1.82*** (0.033) -3.320*** (0.003) 
Period * P0.5 - 4.21*** (0.008) 
Constant 83.70*** (0.000) 87.02*** (0.000) 
Pseudo R^2 0.241 0.276 
N 216 
Note: Regression is censored on the available strategy space 0-100. Robust standard errors are clustered on 
each individual 3 period block and are presented in parenthesis. 
 
Table 3.9 shows average profits across each treatment for bidders and sellers. Recall that the initial 
endowment was 100. Thus, in the P0 treatment bidders lost on average 4.11% of their initial 
endowment. In addition, sellers made an average profit of 29.65%. In the P0.5 treatment, on the other 
hand, bidders made positive profits on average (albeit only equal to 2.03% of their initial endowment). 
Sellers still earn positive profits, in this case 26.38% of their initial endowment. It is interesting to note 
that the profit earned by bidders barely increases between the P0.5 and P1 treatments, suggesting 
that the P0.5 treatment does not fare badly at overcoming the moral hazard present in P0.5 that is 













P0 104.34 95.89 129.65 
P0.5 105.5 102.03 126.38 
P1 102.65 102.65 N/A 
Note: Average profit is the final endowment minus the initial endowment of 100. 
 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion  
We present here a nascent theoretical construct of a repeated moral hazard auction that features 
Bayesian uncertainty about the type of seller that bidders are matched with. We additionally present 
the results of the first experimental test of such a theoretical environment. We conduct three 
treatments in which the distribution of seller types varies between treatments. The current paper thus 
seeks to extend the canonical SE literature by incorporating competitive group dynamics through the 
form of a market-based institution, in this case an auction.  
We find that when there is no behavioural Bayesian uncertainty of the SE kind, the results closely 
mirror both the theoretical prediction and the vast literature on experimental auction markets, which 
of course coincide. Bidders place higher bids in as the probability of encountering a seller that 
overcomes the moral hazard of the auction increases. There is also evidence that bidders employ 
conditional strategies on the basis of the information available to them - whether the good was sent 
in the previous period or not - but only when there is Bayesian behavioural uncertainty present. In a 
pure moral hazard auction, many bidders systematically make positive and substantial bids, something 
the theory presented is unable to account for, though such findings are not surprising.  
We also find evidence that sellers respond to the different reputational considerations present the 
Bayesian uncertainty introduces. Both regression analysis and non-parametric statistics show a 
significant difference in the probability with which the seller sends the good, with sellers on average 
choosing a higher probability when bidders could entertain Bayesian uncertainty as to the seller type. 
In other words, sellers are more likely to send the good in the early periods, when they can mimic the 
computerised seller, as per the canonical sequential equilibrium model. In addition, the sellers in the 
treatment featuring Bayesian uncertainty substantially lower the probability with which they choose 
to send the good immediately before being rematched (or the experiment ending). This suggests 
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sellers engage in strategic reputation formation - this is backed up by the fact that the equilibrium 
prediction in this case is able to explain approximately half of all seller behaviour. In addition, some 
sellers make explicit reference to “copying the computer” in early rounds to be exploited for benefit 
in later periods. The results presented thus indicate that the intuition behind the sequential 
equilibrium framework can be extended to multi-player games.  
It is important to understand how the existing insights on reputation from the SE literature can be 
extended to market-based institutions. The results here extend the canonical literature on SE by 
suggesting that reputational considerations are also an important phenomenon in multi-player, 
market-based games. Of course, as with much SE literature there are significant deviations from 
equilibrium that are not reconcilable with any form of SE. Nonetheless, many of the qualitative and 
intuitive findings of the SE reputation literature are still present even when the stage game takes the 
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Appendix 3.A: Experimental Instructions 
Economic Decision Making Experiment 
- Instructions  
Welcome to the Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory (BEEL). This is an 
experiment in decision making. The University of Birmingham has provided the funding for 
this research. It is very important that you read the instructions carefully.  
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have 
any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter 
will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you 
will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your following of these rules.  
We will firstly go over the instructions together. You will then have a chance to ask 
clarifying questions. Each of you will then answer a few questions to make sure everybody 
understands. You will be given an initial endowment of 100 ECU. You will be paid according 
to the number of ECUs you have at the end of the experiment. You will be paid according to 
the following exchange rate;  
1 ECU = 10p  
In addition to this initial endowment, you have already earned a £2.50 show up fee. We 
would like to stress that any decision you make is completely anonymous. You will be paid 




Throughout this experiment, you will be randomly assigned to a role by the computer. This 
role will remain fixed throughout the duration of the experiment. Each subject will be 
assigned as either a bidder or a seller. In total there are 14 participants in this session, 12 
participants will be assigned the role of bidder and the remaining 2 participants will be 
assigned the role of seller.  
Groups  
From the 12 bidders, 4 groups of 3 bidders each will be formed. This group of bidders will 
remain fixed throughout the experiment. Each group of bidders will then be matched to 1 of 
4 sellers; either 1 of the 2 participants assigned the role of seller or 1 of 2 computer 
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programmed sellers. The behaviour of the computer programmed seller will be thoroughly 
explained below.  
Once all 4 groups have been formed, 3 periods of a decision scenario described 
below will be played. Once 3 periods have been played, the group of bidders will then be 
matched to a different seller. This process then continues until each group of bidders 
have been matched with each seller. You will never be matched with the same group of 
bidders or seller in more than one decision scenario. This implies each subject will take 
part in 4 different decision scenarios each lasting 3 periods and each with a different 
group of bidders or seller. The order of the matching is decided at random.  




Decision Scenario  
In each period, each bidder will have the opportunity to bid on a fictional product belonging 
to the seller. The winning bidder then exchanges the fictional good for a certain number of 
ECUs. That certain number is referred to as the bidder’s valuation. Sellers then decide 
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whether they wish to send the good or not. If the seller does not send the good, the 
winning bidder cannot exchange it for ECUs. The seller has a cost, in ECU, that must be 
paid in order to send the good.  
A single period of the decision scenario is as follows;  
 Each bidder will receive a valuation - this is the number of ECU a bidder receives if 
they were the winning bidder and the seller sent the good. For each bidder, this 
value will be a random number between 5 and 10. The seller will receive a cost 
associated with sending the good. This cost will be a random number between 0 
and 5.  
 Each bidder will then place a bid for the fictional good, which can be any number 




 The winning bidder is the bidder who places the highest bid. In the case of a tie, 
each bidder with the equal highest bid wins with equal probability. The price is equal 
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to the second highest bid. The price is removed from the winning bidder’s 
endowment of ECUs.  
 The seller then decides whether to send the good or not. The seller is charged 
their cost if they choose to send the good and receives the price from the winning 
bidder regardless. If the seller does not send the good, then the winning bidder 
does not receive the good and cannot exchange it for their value - even though they 
have already paid for it. If the seller does send the good, the bidder will receive 
the good and can exchange it for their valuation in ECUs. The seller makes their 
decision on a screen that can be seen below;  
 
 Each bidder and the seller is then informed of their profit for the period. A detailed 
description of profit calculation will be outlined below.  
This concludes a single period of the decision scenario. As described above, each 
decision scenario will consist of 3 periods. After the third period, each group of bidders 
will be matched with a new seller and a new decision scenario will begin. The experiment 




We will now go through how profit is calculated in detail. 
Bidder Profit 
A bidder can only make profit if they were the highest bidder. If a bidder is not the 
highest bidder, then they receive profit of zero for this round. If the bidder was the highest 
bidder, the profit is as follows; 
Value - Price   if the seller sent the good  
 
-Price   if the seller did not send the good  
 
Note that the profit for the highest bidder can be negative if the seller does not send 
the good. The price is still paid but the good is not received.  
Bankruptcy  
Since it is possible for a bidder to receive negative profit, a bidder may end up with no 
ECU left. In this case, the bidder is declared bankrupt and will take no further part in 
experiment and will only receive the show up fee of £2.50.  
 
Seller Profit 
A seller can only make a profit if there are any positive bids. If no bidder decides to 
place a bid, then the seller receives zero profit for the period. If there are positive bids 
placed, then the profit for the seller is; 
 
Price – Cost  if the seller chose to send the good  
 
Price   if the seller chose not to send the good  
 
Random Device  
Each seller can, if they wish, make their decision using a random device. For example, 
instead of definitely choosing to send the good, each seller is able to enter the 
71 
 
probability with which they would like to send the good. Clearly, 100 corresponds to 
sending the good for sure and 0 corresponds to not sending the good for sure. However, if 
the seller chooses some probability strictly between 0 and 100 then the computer will 
randomly choose whether to send the good or not, according to the chosen 
probability.  
History  
Within a single decision scenario, you will be able to see a history of what has happened 
in the previous periods of the particular decision scenario. You will only be able to see 
what happened in previous decision scenarios that you were part of. An example 





The history available to the bidder includes the following information;  
 Decision scenario - The decision scenario, out of 4.  
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 Period - The period, out of 3.  
 Price - The price in this period.  
 Send - Indicates whether the seller sent the good, or not.  
 Profit - Your profit at the end of the period.  
 Endowment - Your total endowment at the end of the period.  
The computer programmed seller  
As mentioned above, only 2 of the 4 sellers will be actual subjects, with the remaining 2 
sellers being operated by a computer programmed to always send the good. The 
computer is programmed to always send the good, regardless of the winning price. As 
mentioned above, each group of bidders will take part in 2 decision scenarios involving a 
’real’ seller (i.e. another participant) and 2 decision scenarios involving a computer 
programmed seller.  
Please raise your hand and an experimenter will come and answer your question. 
Please do not ask questions out loud. 
If nobody has any further questions, you will be asked to fill out a series of questions to 
ensure everybody understands the instructions. You will then be asked to make your 
decisions for the experiment. You will then be asked to fill out a short questionnaire; you do 




Control Questions  
 You will either be a bidder or a seller. Will this change throughout the experiment? 
...................................................  
 How many decision scenarios will you take part in?......................................  
 How many periods are in each decision scenario?.....................................  
Imagine the following scenario. A bidder has a valuation of 9. They place a bid of 8 and are 
the highest bidder. The price is 7. The seller had a cost of 2 and did send the good.  
 How much profit does the bidder receive?................................  
 How much profit does the seller receive?..................................  
Imagine the following scenario. A bidder has a valuation of 9. They place a bid of 8 and are 
the highest bidder. The price is 7. The seller had a cost of 2 and did not send the good.  
 How much profit does the bidder receive?................................  





Appendix 3.B: Additional Regression Analysis 
Table 3.1: Tobit regression with the bid as the dependent variable. 
Estimation Technique Random Effects GLS 
Dependent Variable Bid 
P0.5 1.107*** (0.313) 
P1 2.048*** (0.485) 
Value 0.717*** (0.034) 
Belief 0.027*** (0.002) 
Previous Bid 0.575*** (0.026) 
Previous Bid * P0.5 -0.311*** (0.067) 
Previous Bid * P1 -0.376*** (0.053) 
Previous Sent 0.581*** (0.183) 
Constant -4.554*** (0.264) 
N 1188 
Note: Random Effects GLS Regression clustered on the period (11 clusters). 
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
 
Table 3.2: Tobit regression with the bid as the dependent variable. 
Estimation Technique Random Effects GLS 
Dependent Variable Bid 
P0.5 1.107*** (0.563) 
P1 2.048*** (0.557) 
Value 0.717*** (0.051) 
Belief 0.027*** (0.005) 
Previous Bid 0.575*** (0.047) 
Previous Bid * P0.5 -0.311*** (0.082) 
Previous Bid * P1 -0.376*** (0.075) 
Previous Sent 0.581*** (0.166) 
Constant -4.554*** (0.472) 
N 1188 
Note: Random Effects GLS Regression clustered on the group of bidders (36 







Public Goods Games with Structural Heterogeneities 




We present the results of two public goods experiments (a one-shot and repeated variant) 
that seek to investigate the interaction between the endowment and marginal return in 
heterogeneous groups. We implement two novel treatments that vary the relationship 
between the endowment and marginal return in either an inverse or a proportional way. 
In the inverse treatment, two normatively appealing contribution rules are in conflict; 
contributions being proportional to endowment and contributions being proportional to 
marginal return. In a one-shot setting, we find that those with high income but low public 
good benefits contribute significantly less than expected by other subjects in their group. 
In particular, there is also a conflict in expectations between those with low income but 
high public goods benefit.  In a repeated setting, we find that when the relationship is 
inverse there is equality of absolute contributions and when the relationship is 
proportional there is equality of contributions as a proportion of the initial endowment 
(equivalently, the marginal return). Additionally, we consider the welfare and 
distributional impacts of the public goods mechanism and find that whilst the inverse 
relation between endowment and marginal return reduces inequality, the proportional 
relationship does not.  
 
 
JEL Codes: C92, H41, D63 




4.1  Introduction 
Many societies can be characterised by an uneven income distribution. For example, according to the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS), the income distribution of the United Kingdom is such that the top 
quintile of households have pre-tax income of sixteen times that of the bottom quintile of households 
(ONS, 2013, p.10). The benefits acquired from the provision of certain public goods are also in many 
cases not homogeneous. For example, according to the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), approximately 
25% of those earning in excess of £100, 000 per annum utilise private education and/or healthcare 
services (IFS, 2010, p.39/46).37 This corresponds to average healthcare expenditures of £400 and 
education expenditures of £4, 000 per annum. By contrast, of those earning £20, 000, only 
approximately 5% utilise private healthcare and education services. Income and/or the benefits 
accrued from public goods provision are therefore not homogeneous. Further, it appears that benefits 
from public goods provision and income may be inversely related to one another since higher income 
is associated with higher procurement of privately provided public goods. The purpose of the current 
study is to investigate how the relationship between income and the benefits from public goods 
provision impact on pro-social behaviour and ultimately welfare in social dilemmas.  
The public goods game (or voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM)) involves a mechanism whereby 
provision of the public good is beneficial to all in the group, but it is not beneficial to any given 
individual to provide contributions towards the public good. The benefit each group member receives 
per unit of public goods provision is known as the marginal per capita return (MPCR) and if the cost of 
providing one unit of the public good exceeds the MPCR, then it is not individually rational to provide 
contributions. As such, it is an important construct for understanding the conflict between private and 
social (or group) benefit that is implicit in many real life social dilemmas. Two of the most fundamental 
parameters of the public goods game are the initial endowment and MPCR. 38 There have been many 
studies investigating what behavioural consequences are when either the initial endowment (for 
example, Kocher et al (2008)) or the MPCR vary (for example, Isaac and Walker (1988), Isaac et al 
(1994) or Nosenzo et al (2015)) in isolation. A typical finding in the existing literature is that the higher 
the endowment or the marginal per capita return from the public good, the higher the absolute levels 
of contributions are. Indeed, in a meta-analysis using 27 studies, Zelmer (2003) finds that the MPCR is 
                                                          
37 Naturally, one can imagine specific examples of public goods for which benefits are necessarily homogeneous, 
such as defence spending or street lighting, such examples are not the focus of the current study.  
38 The only other parameter which could feasibly be considered fundamental to the game is the number of 
players. Whilst the group size has been clearly shown to effect behaviour in public goods games (especially with 
respect to the effect of the MPCR, see Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994)), the effect of the group size is not the 
focus of the current study. 
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crucial in affecting pro-social behaviour in public good game environments. In all the studies reported, 
the impact of the endowment or the marginal per capita return are examined separately by changing 
one of these two parameters.  However, we know little about whether and if so how the interaction 
of these two effects shapes behaviour in public good games and subsequently, how welfare changes 
(as measured by net earnings) are determined in such environments. Given the extant heterogeneities 
in both income and public goods benefit observed in naturally occurring data, understanding how 
these heterogeneities interact and affect voluntary contributions is an important and open question 
in the literature. 
The most closely related literature is that which features groups that are heterogeneous in either the 
endowment or the marginal return. Chan et al (1996) present an experimental test that is broadly 
supportive of the Bergstrom et al (1986) predictions39, at least in terms of directions of differences. 
This result contrasts, however, with Reuben and Riedl (2013) who find no difference in contribution 
between a ‘high’ and ‘low’ endowment type in a baseline control treatment of an investigation into 
the efficacy of punishment mechanisms in such settings. Reuben and Riedl (2013) also find that in 
groups with heterogeneous marginal return, those with higher marginal return contribute more, albeit 
weakly. Further still, van Dijk et al (2002) find heterogeneous endowments may lead to lower 
contributions by those with a higher endowment. Gӓchter et al (2017) implement a repeated public 
goods game with endogenous differences in initial endowments (previous period income carries over 
throughout the periods). They find that the availability of a punishment mechanism has little effect on 
contributions. Additionally, Gӓchter et al (2017) analyse the ex-post income distribution in terms of 
the Gini coefficient to assess the welfare impacts of the public goods mechanism under various 
treatment conditions. 
In this paper, we present the results of two public goods experiments (the first one-shot and the 
second repeated) that seek to investigate the interaction between the endowment and the marginal 
return. The experiment features a comprehensive set of possible relationships between the 
endowment and marginal return to better understand the interaction between these two fundamental 
parameters. In the first experiment, we implement a one-shot public goods game in which the 
relationship between the endowment and marginal return (within a group) is either inverse or 
proportional, depending on the treatment. In the inverse treatment, those with the highest 
endowment have the lowest marginal return and vice versa (i.e. negative correlation) whilst in the 
                                                          
39 Bergstrom et al (1986) derive a theoretical prediction that heterogeneous endowments (and thus income 
inequality) lead to greater overall contributions to the public good projects that have a strictly interior solution. 
The experimental evidence on this result is mixed. 
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proportional treatment those with the highest endowment also have the highest marginal return (i.e. 
positive correlation). For control purposes, we also include treatments whereby we only vary either 
the endowment, the marginal return or neither. This allows us to understand the causal pure effects 
that the endowment and/or the marginal return generate in terms of pro-social behaviour, when 
reputation and learning effects have been ruled out. In the second experiment, only the inverse and 
proportional treatments are repeated for 15 periods, to  better understand the dynamics and stability 
of behaviour in our novel settings. It is important to note that once we introduce heterogeneity, then 
the marginal return is, by definition, not per capita anymore.  
In the one-shot game, we present results that are broadly in line with the existing literature in terms 
of the effect of the endowment and marginal return individually. We find that those with high income 
but low public good benefits contribute significantly less than expected by other subjects in their 
group. The main findings from these experiments thus indicate a potential conflict between two 
normatively appealing contribution rules; contributions proportional to endowment and contributions 
proportional to marginal return.  
To gain a better understanding of the behavioural effects, we conduct a separate series of 
experiments, whereby we examine how behaviour in the inverse and the proportional treatments is 
shaped and evolves over time. We find that in a repeated setting, when the marginal return and 
endowment are inversely related, contributions are such that the absolute contributions are not 
different. When the marginal return and endowment are proportionally related, we find instead that 
there are no significant differences in contributions as a proportion of endowment (equivalently as a 
proportion of marginal return).  Further, we find additional evidence of the conflict between equality 
of contributions as a proportion of endowment and as a proportion of marginal return in the inverse 
treatment. In response to this conflict, subjects seem to default to another contribution rule; equality 
of absolute contributions. By contrast, these two normatively appealing contribution rules coincide 
exactly in the proportional treatment and thus there is no conflict. As such, subjects have contributions 
that are approximately proportional to both endowment and marginal return throughout the 
experiment. Notably, whilst the inverse relation leads a significantly improved Gini coefficient in every 
period, a proportional relationship has no effect on reducing the extant inequality. 
We contribute to the experimental literature on public goods games by providing the first 
experimental study in which both the endowment and marginal return vary simultaneously within a 
group. This is important given the empirical observations highlighted above. As such, we provide 
valuable insight into public goods games with heterogeneous groups generally (including the effect of 
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income heterogeneity which as discussed above is not clear across the literature) but also into the 
precise nature of the interaction between the endowment and the marginal return when both can 
potentially vary (in particular, the significant differences between an inversely and proportionally 
related endowment and marginal return). This is potentially important when considering the possibility 
of comparing different public goods games that do not use identical parameters. Since our results 
highlight the importance of the interaction between the endowment and marginal return, two 
experiments that feature different marginal returns or endowments may not be comparable. Further, 
we provide evidence on the welfare implications of the public goods game under various groups that 
are heterogeneous in the endowment and/or the marginal return. 
In the next section, we provide precise details of the experimental design for the two experiments, in 
Section 3 we analyse the results of both experiments and in Section 4 we provide discussion and 
concluding remarks. 
4.2  Experimental Design 
4.2.1  Experiment 1 
In our initial experiment, we conduct a one-shot, six-player public goods game to investigate the 
relationship (or interaction) between two fundamental parameters of the public goods game; the 
endowment and the marginal return (commonly called the marginal-per-capita-return or MPCR, but 
we refrain from using this terminology due to the introduction of heterogeneities that renders the 
phrase per-capita obsolete). 
We implement a total of five treatments in which we introduce heterogeneity in; either the 
endowment or the marginal return or both or neither. Heterogeneity in both endowment and 
marginal return is implemented in two opposed ways; either the endowment and marginal return are 
proportional or inversely proportional to one another. 
Subjects earn income according to the standard public goods game profit function (of course, we apply 
an individual subscript to the endowment and return from project as they are not necessarily 
homogeneous); 
 







where 𝑈𝑖  is payment in ECUs (experimental currency units), 𝐸𝑖  is endowment, 𝑋𝑖  is contribution and 𝑟𝑖 
is marginal return. 
The treatments are therefore as follows; 
Treatment 1 (Control): In the control treatment, all subjects have the same endowment and same 
marginal return. 
Treatment 2 (Heterogeneous Return): Subjects types vary only by Marginal Return. All subjects have 
the same endowment. 
Treatment 3 (Heterogeneous Endowment): Subjects types vary only by Endowment. All subjects have 
the same Marginal Return. 
Treatment 4 (Inverse): Endowments and Marginal Returns are inversely proportional to one another. 
Treatment 5 (Proportional): Endowments and Marginal Returns are proportional to one another. 
The possible endowments were either 10, 20 or 30 ECUs and the marginal return was either 0.25, 0.5 
or 0.75. It is worth noting that the five treatments afford us a complete schema of all possible 
combinations of the endowment and return from the project (as can be seen in Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Combinations of Endowment and Marginal Return per Treatment 
 
Marginal Return 






























In particular, each subject can be thought of as having a 'type' that consists of an (Endowment, 
Marginal Return) pair, for example (20, 0.5) referring to Endowment = 20 and Marginal Return = 0.5. 
In treatments 2-5, a total of three types therefore exist and there are exactly two of each type in each 
group (for a total of six subjects per group). Treatment 1 features only one type and thus all six subjects 
have the same type. Six subjects were used per group such that we could elicit a given subject’s belief 
about others with the same type as themselves. A full overview of the types available in each of the 
treatments can be seen in Table 4.2. In this sense, a total of nine types exist across the five treatments 
with the baseline (20, 0.5) type present in all treatments. Across the five treatments both the sum of 
endowments and the sum of marginal returns are identical – eliminating the possibility of any observed 
differences being due to wealth or social efficiency effects. The sum of endowments represents the 
total wealth in the ‘economy’ and by keeping it constant (at 120 ECU), we are only changing the 
distribution of wealth within the economy. The sum of marginal returns represents the number of 
tokens generated per token contributed (in that sense, a measure of the social efficacy of 
contributions) and is similarly kept constant (at a 3:1 ratio) – this is especially important in the presence 
of pro-social preferences. It is worth noting that the fundamental structure of the public goods game 
remains intact across all types in all treatments – free riding is still a dominant strategy for all types in 
all treatments. 







Subject E M.R E M.R E M.R E M.R E M.R 
1 20 0.5 20 0.25 10 0.5 10 0.75 10 0.25 
2 20 0.5 20 0.25 10 0.5 10 0.75 10 0.25 
3 20 0.5 20 0.5 20 0.5 20 0.5 20 0.5 
4 20 0.5 20 0.5 20 0.5 20 0.5 20 0.5 
5 20 0.5 20 0.75 30 0.5 30 0.25 30 0.75 
6 20 0.5 20 0.75 30 0.5 30 0.25 30 0.75 
Total 120 3 120 3 120 3 120 3 120 3 
 
At the beginning of each session, instructions (a copy of which can be found in an appendix) were read 
aloud to all subjects. Subjects were then required to answer some control questions to ensure that 
everybody understood the instructions. Subjects were randomly assigned types and each subject was 
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informed of their own type. Subjects then made their contribution decisions. Beliefs were then elicited 
in an incentivised manner. Subjects were asked to estimate the average contribution of the other 
subjects in their group for all possible types i.e. in treatments 2-5 subjects were asked for three 
separate estimates – one for each of the three possible types. The beliefs were incentivised using a 
step-loss function40 (closer estimates earned more money and sufficiently incorrect estimates earned 
nothing). Subjects were then informed of their earnings for the experiment and asked to fill out a short 
demographic questionnaire that concluded the experiment.  
A total of 312 subjects took part across all five treatments.41 Each subject participated in only one 
treatment. All subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the experimental software was 
programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). All sessions were run at BEEL at the University of 
Birmingham (UK) and all subjects were students at the university from across a wide range of 
disciplines. Sessions lasted on average 50 minutes and subjects received an average payment of £9.38 
(including a £2.50 show-up fee). 
4.2.2  Experiment 2 
In an attempt to investigate the validity and dynamic stability of the results of Experiment 1, we ran a 
set of additional experiments. In these experiments, Treatments 4 (Inverse) and 5 (Proportional) from 
Experiment 1 (the novel treatments of this paper) were repeated for 15 periods within fixed groups 
that remained the same throughout the entire experiment. We refer to these as Treatments 4R and 
5R respectively. All other parameterisation was identical to Experiment 1. Subjects were paid according 
to one randomly selected period to avoid income effects accruing throughout the experiment. A total 
of 120 subjects42 took part across the two treatments and all other procedures were identical to those 
of Experiment 1. Sessions lasted on average 80 minutes and subjects received an average payment of 
£9.82 (including a £2.50 show-up fee). 
 
 
                                                          
40 For a given belief 𝑋 tokens and true value 𝑋∗ tokens, the subject was paid £1 if |𝑋∗ − 𝑋| ≤ 0.5 tokens, £0.60 
if 0.5 < |𝑋∗ − 𝑋| ≤ 1.5 tokens and £0.30 if 1.5 < |𝑋∗ − 𝑋| ≤ 3.5 tokens. Beliefs further than 3.5 tokens from 
the true value received nothing. 
41 The Control (1) treatment had 6 groups (36 participants). The Heterogeneous Return (2) and Proportional (5) 
treatments had 11 groups each (66 participants each). The Heterogeneous Endowment (3) and Inverse (4) 
treatments had 12 groups each (72 participants each). 




4.3  Results 
We begin with a comprehensive analysis of the results of Experiment 1 before presenting a 
complementary analysis for Experiment 2. 
4.3.1  Experiment 1 
4.3.1.1 Summary Statistics 
An overview of the aggregate results for Experiment 1 can be seen in Table 4.3 which presents the 
average contribution and belief across all five treatments. We conduct tests for significant differences 
in contribution levels between treatments (a full table of test statistics is available as an Appendix, we 
take as the unit of observation the individual subject since the game is one-shot). Contributions in the 
Heterogeneous Return treatment are marginally higher than the Control (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: p 
= 0.052) and Inverse (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: p = 0.066) treatments. No other differences in overall 
contributions are significant (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: p ≥ 0.238). Similarly, the overall beliefs43 are 
not significantly different between any treatments (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: p ≥ 0.426). This is 
perhaps unsurprising given that the game is one-shot and that the average type is the same in all 
treatments (i.e. (20, 0.5)). We thus state our first formal result. 
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for Experiment 1 
Treatment Observations Contribution Belief 
Control 36 4.22 6.67 
Heterogeneous 
Return 
66 6.27 6.48 
Heterogeneous   
Endowment 
72 6.09 6.77 
Inverse 72 4.58 6.37 
Proportional 66 5.92 6.99 
All 312 5.53 6.65 
 
Result 1: There are no substantial overall treatment differences in contributions or beliefs 
(Experiment 1). 
                                                          
43 The overall belief is an equally weighted average of the three belief estimates where appropriate (i.e. in all but 
the control treatment). 
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Therefore, there is little difference in aggregate behaviour across the five treatments. We now move 
on to a more detailed breakdown of the results within each treatment, parsing the results by type. 
4.3.1.2 Within-Treatment Difference 
Table 4.4 shows the contribution within each treatment according to the subjects’ type. In addition, it 
shows the contribution as a proportion of the endowment. Further, Table 4.5 presents test statistics 
for within-treatment differences in contributions between the various types present. In both the 
Heterogeneous Return and Heterogeneous Endowment treatments, contributions are (weakly) 
monotonically increasing in the marginal return and endowment, respectively. The effect of the 
marginal return in heterogeneous groups is similar to that in Reuben and Riedl (2013), though we also 
find a significant effect of the endowment in heterogeneous groups that Reuben and Riedl (2013) do 
not. 
Figure 4.1: Average Contribution For, and Belief about, each Type by Treatment (Experiment 1). 
 
Note: Each bar represents the average contribution of the labelled type. Each line represents the beliefs by 
the type with the same coloured bar. [I.e. the darker line in the T2 panel is the beliefs by the (20, 0.25) type 




Similarly, in the Proportional treatment, as both the marginal return and endowment increase 
together, contributions (weakly) monotonically increase. This is perhaps not unexpected given that it 
is a compounding of two positive effects on contribution. Behaviour in the Inverse treatment is 
however more interesting, with only the (10, 0.75) and (20, 0.5) types being significantly different. It is 
worth noting that the contribution as a proportion of endowment (see Table 4.4) is higher for the (20, 
0.5) type at 0.34 than the (30, 0.25) type at 0.16. This difference is statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney Rank Sum: p = 0.027).44 
Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for each Treatment by Type (Experiment 1). 
Treatment Type Contribution… 
…as Proportion of 
Endowment 
Control (20, 0.5) 4.22 0.21 
Heterogeneous 
Return 
(20, 0.25) 3.91 0.20 
(20, 0.5) 5.09 0.25 
(20, 0.75) 9.82 0.49 
Heterogeneous   
Endowment 
(10, 0.5) 2.04 0.20 
(20, 0.5) 6.71 0.34 
(30, 0.5) 9.54 0.32 
Inverse 
(10, 0.75) 2.17 0.22 
(20, 0.5) 6.83 0.34 
(30, 0.25) 4.75 0.16 
Proportional 
(10, 0.25) 2.68 0.27 
(20, 0.5) 6.55 0.33 
(30, 0.75) 8.55 0.29 
 
Result 2: Within each treatment, contributions increase when the endowment, marginal return or 
both increase in all treatments except the Inverse treatment (Experiment 1). 
Subjects were asked their beliefs about the average contribution for each type present.45 A summary 
of subjects’ responses can be seen in Table 4.6. This information, in addition to the average 
                                                          
44The contribution as a proportion of the endowment is not different between the (10, 0.75) and (20, 0.5) types 
(p=0.146). In all other treatments, the results remain the same as Table 4.3 in terms of significance.  
45 As above, the belief elicitation was incentivised.  
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contribution decisions, can also be seen in Figure 4.1. As can be seen, the beliefs are largely consistent 
with behaviour despite slight over-optimism. It is worth noting that for all types in all treatments, 
beliefs are monotonically increasing in endowment (or marginal return when endowment is 
homogeneous, as in the Heterogeneous Return treatment). Beliefs increase in endowment regardless 
of whether the marginal return co-varies positively or negatively. This difference is significant in all 
treatments46 (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p ≤ 0.006 in all cases, we take the group as the unit of observation 
since we are implicitly comparing beliefs by the same subjects). This suggests that the endowment 
‘dominates’ the marginal return in determining subjects’ beliefs (though notably these beliefs are 
incorrect in the Inverse treatment for the (30, 0,25) type).  
Table 4.5: Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test z-Statistics for Within-Treatment 
Differences in Contributions (Experiment 1). 
Heterogeneous Return Heterogeneous   Endowment 
Type (20, 0.5) (20, 0.75) Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.5) 
(20, 0.25) -0.558 -3.325*** (10, 0.5) -2.679*** -3.730*** 
(20, 0.5) - -2.767*** (20, 0.5) - -1.101 
Inverse Proportional 
Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.25) Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.75) 
(10, 0.75) -3.049*** -1.316 (10, 0.25) -2.155** -2.173** 
(20, 0.5) - 1.248 (20, 0.5) - -0.272 
Note: The test is the two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney-U) test. The figures 
presented are the p-values. 
 
Result 3: Overall beliefs about each type’s contribution increase as that types’ endowment increases, 
or as the marginal return increases if the endowment is homogeneous (Experiment 1). 
Interestingly, there are also some within-treatment differences in beliefs. These can be seen in Table 
4.7. None of the types present in the Heterogeneous Return treatment show significantly different 
beliefs. Similarly, in the Proportional treatment none of the types have significantly different beliefs 
about any types. There are some significant differences in the Heterogeneous Endowment case; in 
                                                          
46 Beliefs are actually monotonically increasing in endowment in every group. 
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both cases where the difference is significant47, the (10, 0.5) type is being significantly more pessimistic 
in the sense that they expect lower contributions. 












(20, 0.25) 3.18 6 9.5 6.22 
(20, 0.5) 2.81 5.72 9.23 5.92 
(20, 0.75) 4.59 7.36 9.95 7.30 












(10, 0.5) 2.58 6.38 8.5 5.81 
(20, 0.5) 3.63 7.42 10.96 7.33 
(30, 0.5) 3.88 7.29 10.33 7.16 
Total 3.36 7.03 9.93  
Inverse Type 
Belief About 







(10, 0.75) 2.21 6.79 10.25 6.42 
(20, 0.5) 4.33 7.63 9.17 7.04 
(30, 0.25) 3.46 6.04 7.42 5.63 
Total 3.33 6.81 8.94  
Proportional Type 
Belief About 







(10, 0.25) 2.32 7.14 10.45 6.63 
(20, 0.5) 3.73 7.27 12.14 7.71 
(30, 0.75) 3.18 6.64 10.05 6.62 
Total 3.08 7.02 10.88  
 
                                                          
47 The (10, 0.5) and (30, 0.5) types have significantly different beliefs about the (10, 0.5) type. The (10, 0.5) and 
(20, 0.5) types have significantly different beliefs about the (30, 0.5) type. See Table 4.7. 
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The most interesting case, however, is the Inverse treatment. In this case, we witness a significant 
`crossing’ effect in beliefs between the (10, 0.75) and (30, 0.25) types, such that each of these two 
types has higher beliefs about how much the other will contribute then how much the other thinks 
they should contribute themselves. This can also be seen visually in Figure 4.1. For example, the (10, 
0.75) have beliefs of 2.21 about their own type, whereas the (30, 0.25) type have beliefs of 3.46 about 
the (10, 0.25). Thus the (30, 0.25) type believes the (10, 0.75) type will contribute more than they  










Type (20, 0.5) (20, 0.75) (20, 0.5) (20, 0.75) (20, 0.5) (20, 0.75) 
(20, 0.25) 0.231 -1.354 0.790 -1.254 0.595 -1.022 









Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.25) (20, 0.5) (30, 0.5) (20, 0.5) (30, 0.5) 
(10, 0.5) -1.454 -1.945 -0.666 -1.072 -1.650* -0.984 








Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.25) (20, 0.5) (30, 0.25) (20, 0.5) (30, 0.25) 
(10, 0.75) -2.753*** -1.890 -0.841 0.783 0.839 2.026** 








Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.75) (20, 0.5) (30, 0.75) (20, 0.5) (30, 0.75) 
(10, 0.25) -1.812* -1.022 -0.033 0.430 -0.824 0.033 
(20, 0.5) - 0.895 - 0.464 - 0.888 
 
themselves believe. In contrast, the (30, 0.25) type have beliefs of 7.42 about their own type, whereas 
the (10, 0.75) type have beliefs of 10.25 about the (30, 0.25) type. Thus the (10, 0.75) type believes the 
(30, 0.25) type will contribute more than they themselves believe. This difference is significant in both 
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directions (see Table 4.7; Mann-Whitney Rank Sum: p = 0.059 and p = 0.043 respectively). No other 
treatment has this `crossing’ effect in terms of beliefs between any of the types. Thus, beliefs in the 
Inverse treatment appear to be self-serving. As noted in Reuben and Riedl (2013), both contributions 
being proportional to endowment and contributions being proportional to marginal return represent 
significant and focal contribution rules. It is worth noting that the Inverse treatment is the only 
treatment in which these two are directly opposed, leading to tensions that are characteristic of the 
tensions present in the empirical evidence on the link between income and the benefits from (certain) 
public goods.  
Result 4: Beliefs about each type by each type are largely not different except in the Inverse 
treatment. In the Inverse treatment, we witness significantly different beliefs between the (10, 0.75) 
and (30, 0.25) types about each other in a ‘self-serving’ manner. 
To summarise the results of Experiment 1, whilst we find little difference in aggregate behaviour 
between the various treatments, we do find important and significant differences both within 
treatments and between treatments at the individual level (i.e. accounting for the subjects’ types). To 
investigate both the stability and the robustness of these results, a second experiment was designed 
in which the two novel (Inverse and Proportional) treatments were repeated for 15 periods, as outlined 
in detail in Section 2. 
4.3.2  Experiment 2 
In this section, we provide an analysis of Experiment 2 - the repeated version of Experiment 1 for the 
Inverse and Proportional treatments - in a manner analogous to the analysis of Experiment 1.  
4.3.2.1 Summary Statistics 
A summary of the average contribution and belief across all types and all periods can be seen in Table 
4.8. The difference in average contributions across the two treatments is not significant (Mann-
Whitney Rank-Sum: p = 0.239). Similarly, the difference in average beliefs across the two treatments 
is also not significant (Mann-Whitney Rank-Sum: p = 0.342). We turn now to more detailed analysis of 
within-treatment differences across types. 





Table 4.8: Summary Statistics for Experiment 2 
Treatment Observations Contribution Belief 
Inverse 9 4.17 4.30 
Proportional 11 5.34 5.33 
All 20 4.70 4.77 
Note: Each observation refers to a group of 6 subjects. 
 
4.3.2.2 Within-Treatment Differences 
Table 4.9 shows the contribution and the contribution as a proportion of the endowment within each 
treatment, according to the subjects’ type. There is no significant difference in contributions between 
any of the types present in the Inverse Repeated treatment (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p ≥ 0.722 in all 
cases). In the Proportional Repeated treatment, the (10, 0.25) type contributes significantly less than 
both the (20, 0.5) and (30, 0.75) types (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p = 0.066 and p = 0.015 respectively). 
The (20, 0.5) and (30, 0.75) types are not significantly different (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p = 0.110). This 
mirrors exactly the pattern found in the one-shot Proportional treatment. 
Table 4.9: Summary Statistics for each Treatment by Type (Experiment 2). 
Treatment Type Contribution… 
…as Proportion of 
Endowment 
Inverse 
(10, 0.75) 4.21 0.42 
(20, 0.5) 3.99 0.20 
(30, 0.25) 4.34 0.14 
Proportional 
(10, 0.25) 2.91 0.29 
(20, 0.5) 5.14 0.26 
(30, 0.75) 7.97 0.27 
 
It is worth noting that whilst the actual contribution is not significantly different between any of the 
types in the Inverse Repeated treatment, the (10, 0.75) type contributes significantly more as a 
proportion of the endowment, compared to both the (20, 0,5) and (30, 0.25) types (Wilcoxon Signed-
Rank: p = 0.004 and p = 0.013 respectively). On the other hand, the contribution as a proportion of the 
endowment is not significantly different between any of the types in the Proportional treatment 
(Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p ≥ 0.679), despite significant differences in absolute contributions. This may 
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be due to the establishment of differing fairness norms between the two treatments (for example, 
equity of contributions in the Inverse treatment and equity of contributions as a proportion of 
endowment in the Proportional treatment). 
Result 6: There are no significant differences in contributions between the types in the Inverse 
treatment. In the Proportional treatment, the type with low endowment and marginal return 
contributes significantly less than the other types. 
We now look at overall beliefs between types. Only the difference between the (10, 0.75) and (20, 0.5) 
types in the Inverse Repeated treatment is significant (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p=0.075). No other 
differences in overall beliefs are significant (p ≥ 0.168 in all cases, see the Appendix). This is mostly 
consistent with the one-shot experiment and the fact that the average type is (20, 0.5) in both 
treatments. 
Once again, subjects were asked their beliefs about the average contribution for each type 
present48. A summary of subjects’ responses can be seen in Table 4.10. As can be seen, there 
is very little difference in beliefs about each of the types in the Inverse treatment (Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank: p > 0.328 for 7 of the 9 tests). The only significant differences are between the 
beliefs about the (10, 0.75) and (20, 0.5) types. On the other hand, all but one of the 
differences are significant in the Proportional treatment, showing that beliefs increase as both 
the endowment and marginal return increases (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p ≤ 0.038 for 8 of the 
9 tests). 
 
Result 7: Overall beliefs about each type are largely not different in the Inverse Repeated 
treatment. Overall beliefs about each type increase in that types’ endowment (and marginal 
return) in the Proportional Repeated treatment.  
 
There are few significant differences between any of the types in terms of their beliefs about the other 
types in either treatment. Interestingly, in the Inverse Repeated treatment, both the (10, 0.75) and 
(30, 0.25) have significantly higher beliefs about the (20, 0.5) than the (20, 0.5) have about their own 
type (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p=0.026 and p=0.041, respectively). Notably, the `crossing’ effect that 
was witnessed in the one-shot Inverse treatment (and was interpreted as ‘self-serving beliefs’) is no 
                                                          
48 As before, the belief elicitation remained incentivised, though a random period was chosen for payment.  
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longer present (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p≥0.248 in all other cases in the Inverse Repeated treatment). 
In the Proportional Repeated treatment, only one difference is (weakly) significant; the beliefs of the 
(20, 0.5) and (30, 0.75) about the (10, 0.25) type (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p=0.066). No other 
differences are significant (Wilcoxon Signed-Rank: p≥0.110 in all cases). 












(10, 0.75) 3.95 4.80 4.79 4.51 
(20, 0.5) 3.98 3.85 4.55 4.12 
(30, 0.25) 3.91 4.70 4.21 4.27 
Total 3.94 4.45 4.52  
Proportional Type 
Belief About 







(10, 0.25) 2.69 5.33 8.19 5.40 
(20, 0.5) 2.81 5.15 8.54 5.50 
(30, 0.75) 3.03 5.01 7.21 5.08 
Total 2.84 5.16 7.98  
 
 
In the Proportional Repeated treatment, only 12.35% (100/810) of subjects believe the (30, 0.75) type 
will contribute less than the (10, 0.25) endowment type. By contrast, in the Inverse Repeated 
treatment 41.11% (407/990) of subjects believe the (30, 0.25) type will contribute less than the (10, 
0.75) type. Similarly, in Inverse Repeated, 9.49% (94/990) believe contributions will be equal whereas 
in Proportional Repeated this is only 3.46 % (28/810). This lends support to the suggestion that the 
Inverse and Proportional Repeated treatments feature different focal points – the equality of absolute 
versus relative contributions. As was noted before, the Inverse treatment features a conflict between 
contributions that are proportional to endowment and contributions that are proportional to marginal 
return. In this case it may be that subjects use an equality of contributions rule previously contribution 
rules identified in Reuben and Riedl (2013).  
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To summarise Experiment 2, the Inverse and Proportional treatments from Experiment 1 were 
repeated for 15 periods. Whilst in the Inverse Repeated treatment absolute contributions are the same 
for all types, in the Proportional Repeated treatment it is relative contributions that are not different 
between the various types. Subjects’ beliefs across the two treatments are also consistent with this 
observation. We now move on to assess the welfare implications of the voluntary contribution 
mechanisms under our various treatment conditions. 
 
Figure 4.2: Average Contribution by and Belief about each type across the 15 Periods for each 
Treatment (Experiment 2). 
 
 
4.3.3  Inequality, Welfare and Income (Re-)Distribution 
In this subsection, we wish to consider the distributional impacts of the voluntary contribution 
mechanism under our treatment conditions and the differing initial income distributions. To do this, 
we calculate the ex-ante Gini coefficient for each treatment and compare it with the Gini coefficient 
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of the ex-post income distribution.49 In this way, we can see whether the voluntary contribution 
mechanism has a positive or negative effect on inequality in terms of income (re-)distribution, at least 
as measured by the Gini coefficient. 
We first consider the average ex-post income for each type within each treatment. This information 
can be seen in Table 4.11, which shows the ex-ante endowment50, the ex-post income and the 
percentage difference. In all cases the average ex-post income is higher than the ex-ante endowment 
such that all types in all treatments benefit from the mechanism on average. In all but the 
Heterogeneous Return and Proportional treatments, the types with the lowest endowment experience 
the greatest percentage increase between their initial endowment and final income. 
In the Heterogeneous Return treatment, the percentage increase in ex-post income compared to ex-
ante endowment increases with the marginal return. This is due the nature of the voluntary 
contribution mechanism (recall that the (20, 0.75) have significantly higher contributions but still 
experience the largest percentage increase in income). By contrast, in the Heterogeneous Endowment 
treatment, the increase in income is decreasing in the endowment. Since all subjects have the same 
marginal return, this is again consistent with the observed contributions. 
With regards to the Inverse and Proportional treatments, the first thing to note is the similarity 
between the one-shot and repeated treatments. In both the Inverse and Inverse Repeated treatments, 
the percentage increase in income is decreasing in endowment (and thus increasing in marginal 
return). The Proportional and Proportional Repeated treatments, however, have similar increases in 
the percentage increase in income for all the types. This is once again consistent with the observed 
behaviour. In the Proportional treatments, contributions as a proportion of endowment are not 
significantly different and thus the percentage increase in income is not different. In the Inverse 
treatments, since contributions are not significantly different the types with the lowest endowments 
receive the biggest percentage increase as a proportion of their original income. This is further 




                                                          
49 For each group and for each period where appropriate. 
50 Which is, of course, directly determined by the subjects’ type.  
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Table 4.11: Ex-Ante Endowment, Ex-Post Income and % Difference for each Type 
(Experiment 1 and 2) 
Treatment Type Ex-Ante Ex-Post 
% 
Increase 
Control (20, 0.5) 20 28.44 42.2 
Heterogeneous 
Return 
(20, 0.25) 20 25.50 27.5 
(20, 0.5) 20 33.73 68.65 
(20, 0.75) 20 38.40 92.00 
Heterogeneous   
Endowment 
(10, 0.5) 10 26.25 162.50 
(20, 0.5) 20 31.58 57.90 
(30, 0.5) 30 38.75 29.17 
Inverse (One-
Shot) 
(10, 0.75) 10 28.46 184.60 
(20, 0.5) 20 26.91 34.55 
(30, 0.25) 30 32.13 7.10 
Proportional 
(One-Shot) 
(10, 0.25) 10 16.20 62.00 
(20, 0.5) 20 31.23 56.15 
(30, 0.75) 30 48.11 60.37 
Inverse 
(Repeated) 
(10, 0.75) 10 24.59 145.90 
(20, 0.5) 20 28.54 42.70 
(30, 0.25) 30 31.92 6.40 
Proportional 
(Repeated) 
(10, 0.25) 10 15.09 50.90 
(20, 0.5) 20 30.89 54.45 
(30, 0.75) 30 46.06 53.53 
 
Table 4.12 shows for each treatment both the ex-ante and ex-post Gini coefficient calculated using the 
ex-ante endowment and ex-post income distribution, as appropriate. Both the Control and 
Heterogeneous Return treatments have an initial Gini coefficient of 0 since all subjects have the same 
endowment. In both cases the voluntary contribution mechanism is therefore inequality increasing. In 
all other treatments, the initial Gini coefficient is 0.22. Of these, all treatments except the Proportional 
treatments have a positive effect on inequality as interpreted by a reduced Gini coefficient (i.e. it 
reduces the level of inequality). The Proportional treatments leave the Gini coefficient at largely the 
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same level, which is entirely consistent with all types having similar % increase in income due to the 
nature of the Gini coefficient calculation51. 







Control 0 0.074 21.11% 
Heterogeneous Return 0 0.107 31.36% 
Heterogeneous 
Endowment 
0.222 0.132 30.48% 
Inverse (One-Shot) 0.222 0.111 22.92% 
Proportional (One-
Shot) 
0.222 0.245 29.61% 
Inverse (Repeated) 0.222 0.141 20.89% 
Proportional 
(Repeated) 
0.222 0.238 26.71% 
Note: The ex-ante Gini coefficient is calculated using the initial endowments. The ex-post Gini coefficient is 
calculated using the final income distribution (in ECUs). Efficiency is calculated as the percentage of 
maximum possible ECUs (120) contributed to the project, which is equivalent to the maximum potential 
gains realised. 
 
Figure 4.3 displays the 95% confidence intervals for the Gini coefficient for each of the one-shot 
treatments (i.e. Experiment 1). As above, the Control and Heterogeneous Return treatments feature 
an increase in Gini since the initial Gini was 0. As can also be seen, the Gini coefficient in the 
Proportional treatment is not significantly different from the initial value of 0.22. In both the 
Heterogeneous Endowment and Inverse treatment the Gini is significantly reduced from the initial 
value of 0.22. Similarly, Figure 4.4 displays the 95% confidence intervals for the repeated treatments 
(i.e. Experiment 2) on a per period basis. The 95% confidence intervals do not overlap for any of the 
15 periods. As in Experiment 1, the Proportional Repeated treatment results in no change in the Gini 
                                                          
51 Which effectively compares the cumulative proportion of all income earned by each cumulative proportion of 
the population. For example, if all incomes double, the Gini coefficient will remain the same since the cumulative 
proportions of total income (at any given cumulative proportion of the population) will be unaffected.  
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coefficient from the initial value in any of the 15 periods. By contrast, in the Inverse Repeated 
treatment the Gini is significantly reduced in every single period. Thus, whilst the Inverse treatment 
features a significant reduction from the initial inequality, the Proportional treatment leaves this initial 
inequality the same. 
Figure 4.3: Average Ex-Post Gini Coefficient for each Treatment (Experiment 1). 
 
Note: The bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal line at 0.22 represents the ex-ante Gini 
coefficient in the Heterogeneous Endowment, Inverse and Proportional treatments. In the Control and 
Heterogeneous Return treatments, the ex-ante Gini coefficient is 0. 
 
Result 8: The Inverse and Inverse Repeated treatments lead to a significant reduction in the ex-post 
Gini coefficient. The Proportional and Proportional Repeated treatments have no effect on the ex-
post Gini coefficient. 
To summarise, the Control and Heterogeneous Return treatments lead to an increase in the Gini since 
they initially have perfect equality. The Heterogeneous Endowment, Inverse and Inverse Repeated 
treatments all lead to a significant reduction in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient. The 
Proportional and Proportional Repeated treatments, however, have neither a positive nor negative 
effect on the level of inequality. 
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Figure 4.4: Average Ex-Post Gini Coefficient Across the 15 Periods for each Treatment (Experiment 
2). 
 
Note: The bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The horizontal line at 0.22 represents the ex-ante Gini 
coefficient in the Heterogeneous Endowment, Inverse and Proportional treatments. In the Control and 
Heterogeneous Return treatments, the ex-ante Gini coefficient is 0. 
 
4.4  Conclusion 
We present the results of two experiments both featuring a voluntary contribution mechanism with 
heterogeneous groups. Experiment 1 was one-shot and featured four heterogeneous treatment 
conditions; Heterogeneous Return, Heterogeneous Endowment, Inverse and Proportional. In the 
Inverse treatment, the marginal return and endowment are both heterogeneous and inversely related. 
In the Proportional treatment, they are proportionally related. To our knowledge, these are the first 
experimental results featuring an Inverse or Proportional relationship between the marginal return 
and the endowment. 
Whilst we find no significant differences at the aggregate level, there are significant differences within 
treatments. We add to the varied literature concerning the effect of income heterogeneity with the 
Heterogeneous Endowment treatment, which shows no overall increase in contributions, though 
99 
 
contributions do increase with endowment. In the Heterogeneous Return, we find a (weak) overall 
increase in contributions and also that contributions increase in the marginal return. In the 
Proportional treatment, we find that contributions increase as the marginal return and endowment 
both increase. 
In Experiment 2, the Inverse and Proportional treatments were repeated for 15 periods. We find that 
in the Inverse Repeated treatment, there are no significant differences in absolute contributions, 
though contributions as a proportion of the endowment decrease as the endowment increases. By 
contrast, in the Proportional Repeated treatment, the absolute contribution increases as the 
endowment and marginal return increase and the contributions as a proportion of the endowment are 
not significantly different. 
We also analyse the impact the voluntary contribution mechanism has on the level of inequality by 
considering the Gini coefficient. Treatments with a homogeneous endowment (i.e. the Control and 
Heterogeneous Return) necessarily lead to an increase in inequality since they start with perfect 
equality. The Heterogeneous Endowment and both Inverse treatments lead to reduction in inequality 
whereas the both Proportional treatments have no effect on inequality at all. 
In the Inverse and Inverse Repeated treatments, two normatively appealing contribution rules are 
directly opposed – proportional to endowment and proportional to marginal return – since the 
endowment and marginal return are inversely related. It may be in this case that subjects default to 
another normatively appealing contribution rule – equality of absolute contributions. On the other 
hand, these two contribution rules are exactly the same in the Proportional and Proportional Repeated 
treatments since they are proportionally related and therefore there is no conflict between them. Our 
research suggests that the effect of heterogeneities in both the marginal return and endowment may 
have significant effects on behaviour in the simplest form of the voluntary contribution mechanism. 
These results are robust across both one-shot and repeated settings. 
The voluntary contribution mechanism has consistently proved to be a rich vein of research for an 
extended period of time. The current paper contributes to this literature by presenting the first 
experimental results of heterogeneous groups that vary by both the endowment and marginal return. 
This opens new avenues for future research into the potentially differential effect of, for examples, 
pre-play communication or punishment opportunities under inverse or proportional structuring 
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Appendix 4.A: Experimental Instructions – EXPERIMENT 1 
Decision Making Experiment - Instructions 
Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. This experiment is run by the 
“Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory” and has been financed by various research 
foundations. Just for showing up you have already earned £2.50. You can earn additional money 
depending on the decisions made by you and other participants. It is therefore very important that 
you read these instructions with care. 
 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, 
or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you 
talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and 
appreciate your following of these rules. 
 
We will first jointly go over the instructions. After we have read the instructions, you will have time to 
ask clarifying questions. We would like to stress that any choices you make in this experiment are 
entirely anonymous. Please do not touch the computer or its mouse until you are instructed to do so. 
Thank you. 
 
In the instructions, unless otherwise stated, we will not speak in terms of Pounds, but in terms of 
Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). Your entire earnings will, thus, be calculated in ECUs. At the end 
of the session the total amount of ECUs you have earned will be converted to Pounds at the following 
rate: 1 ECU = 0.20 Pounds. The converted amount will privately be paid to you in cash. 
 
Detailed Information about the Experiment 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. The total amount you will earn from the experiment will be the 





At the beginning of Part 1, participants are divided into groups of six. You will therefore be in a group 
with 5 other participants. At no point during the experiment, nor afterwards will you be informed 
about the identity of the other participants in your group and the other participants will never be 




In Part 1, each of you receives a number of tokens. We call this your endowment. In addition to 
receiving an endowment, each of you receive a number between 0 and 1. We call this your return 
from project. How the return from project affects your earnings will be made clear below. 
 
There are three possible combinations of endowment and return from project as follows; 
 
Endowment = 10 tokens, Return from project = 0.75 
Endowment = 20 tokens, Return from project = 0.5 
Endowment = 30 tokens, Return from project = 0.25 
 
Within each group, exactly 2 participants will be given each of the three possible combinations of the 
endowment and return from project. This means that in each group, 2 participants will have an 
endowment of 10 tokens and a return from project of 0.75, 2 participants will have an endowment of 
20 tokens and a return from project of 0.5 and 2 participants will have an endowment of 30 tokens 
and a return from project of 0.25. The allocation of these combinations of endowment and return 
from project within the group is random. 
 
Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the tokens you 
want to contribute to a project and how many of them to keep for yourself. The five other members 
of your group have to make the same decision.  
 
Every token that you do not contribute to the project automatically belongs to you and earns you 
one ECU. 
 
Every token that you do contribute to the project will earn each group member (including yourself) 
their respective return from project in ECU. 
 
Your income therefore consists of: 
 
(1) The tokens which you have kept for yourself (“Income from retained tokens”) whereby 1 token = 1 
ECU. 
(2) The “Income from the project”. This income is calculated as follows:  




Your Part 1 income in ECUs is: 
 
(Your Endowment – tokens contributed to the project by you) + Your Return from project*(sum of 
all tokens contributed to the project by all members of your group) 
 
When making your decision, the following input-screen will appear: 
 
 
At the top of the screen, you will be informed of the endowment and return from project of the other 
members of your group. (The example used above is only for illustrative purposes). You have to decide 
how many tokens you contribute to the project by typing a number between 0 and your endowment 
in the input field. This field can be reached by clicking it with the mouse. By deciding how many tokens 
to contribute to the project, you automatically decide how many tokens you keep for yourself. After 
entering the amount of tokens you contribute you must press the O.K. button using the mouse. Once 






In Part 2 of the experiment, you will be asked to estimate for each of the three possible combinations 
of endowment and return from project the average contribution to the project within your group. 
You will therefore be required to make three decisions. Note that when estimating the average 
contribution for your combination of the endowment and return from project, you should estimate 
the contribution of the other participant with the same combination as you.  
 
You will be paid according to how close your estimate is to the actual average contribution for that 
particular combination of endowment and return from project. You will be paid £1 for each estimate 
that is within 0.5 tokens of the actual average contribution value in either direction. You will be paid 
£0.60 for each estimate between 0.5 and 1.5 tokens from the actual average contribution value in 
either direction. You will be paid £0.30 for each estimate between 1.5 and 3.5 tokens from the actual 
average contribution value in either direction. You will receive no additional payment for estimates 
further than 3.5 tokens from the actual average contribution value.  
 




When making your decision, the following input-screen will appear: 
 
 
At the top of the screen, you will be reminded of your endowment and return from project. In the 
remaining three boxes you will see each of the three possible combinations of endowment and 
return from project. (The example used above is only for illustrative purposes). In all three boxes, you 
must estimate the average contribution of the other members of your group with that particular 
combination of endowment and return from project. To input your estimate you must type a number 
between 0 and the endowment for that particular estimate. For example, when estimating the 
average contribution for those with endowment of 10 tokens and return from project of 0.75, you 
must enter a number between 0 and 10. As another example, when estimating the average 
contribution for those with endowment of 30 and return from project of 0.25, you must enter a 
number between 0 and 30.  
 
Your total earnings for the experiment are therefore equal to your Part 1 earnings converted into £ 
at the above rate plus your Part 2 earnings, in addition to the show up fee.  
 
Do you have any questions? Please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk. Please 




To ensure everybody understands, each of you will need to answer a few control questions, which you 







Please complete the questions below. In a couple of minutes someone will come to your desk to check 
your answers. Once everybody answers the following questions correctly, the experiment will start. 
(The decisions and earnings used for the questions below are simply for illustrative purposes. In the 
experiment decisions and earnings will depend on the actual choices of the participants.). 
 
 
1. Suppose you have an endowment of 20 and a return from project of 0.5 Suppose that nobody 
(including yourself) contributes any token to the project. What is: 
 
 Your income ?........... 
 The income of the other group members with endowment of 10 tokens?........... 
 The income of the other group member with endowment of 20 tokens?........... 
 The income of the other group members with endowment of 30 tokens?........... 
 
2. Please complete the following table: 
 









10 0.75 0    
10 0.75 1    
20 0.5 4    
20 0.5 8    
30 0.25 12    
30 0.25 15    
Total Contributed to Project:     
 
3. Suppose the average contribution for a particular combination of endowment and return from 
project was 15.5. Suppose you estimate the average will be 13, another group member estimates 10, 
another group member estimates 12 and another group member estimates 16. What is the payment 





 The group member with estimate 10?........... 
 The group member with estimate 12?........... 








Appendix 4.B: Experimental Instructions – EXPERIMENT 2 
Instructions 
 
Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. This experiment is run by the 
“Birmingham Experimental Economics Laboratory” and has been financed by various research 
foundations. Just for showing up you have already earned £2.50. You can earn additional money 
depending on the decisions made by you and other participants. It is therefore very important that 
you read these instructions with care. 
 
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, 
or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you 
talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and 
appreciate your following of these rules. 
 
We will first jointly go over the instructions. After we have read the instructions, you will have time to 
ask clarifying questions. We would like to stress that any choices you make in this experiment are 
entirely anonymous. Please do not touch the computer or its mouse until you are instructed to do so. 
Thank you. 
 
The experiment will consist of 15 periods. Each period will consist of 2 parts, detailed below. At the 
end of the experiment, the computer will randomly select 1 period that will be used to determine your 
payment from the experiment. 
 
In the instructions, unless otherwise stated, we will not speak in terms of Pounds, but in terms of 
Experimental Currency Units (ECUs). Your entire earnings will, thus, be calculated in ECUs. At the end 
of the session the total amount of ECUs you have earned in the randomly selected period will be 
converted to Pounds at the following rate: 1 ECU = 0.20 Pounds. The converted amount will privately 
be paid to you in cash. 
 
Detailed Information about the Experiment 
 
The experiment consists of two parts. The total amount you will earn from the experiment will be the 






At the beginning of Part 1, participants are divided into groups of six. This group will remain the same 
throughout the entire experiment. You will therefore be in a group with 5 other participants. At no 
point during the experiment, nor afterwards will you be informed about the identity of the other 
participants in your group and the other participants will never be informed about your identity.  
 
In Part 1, each of you receives a number of tokens. We call this your endowment. In addition to 
receiving an endowment, each of you receives a number between 0 and 1. We call this your return 
from project. How the return from project affects your earnings will be made clear below. 
 
There are three possible combinations of endowment and return from project as follows; 
 
2. Endowment = 10 tokens, Return from project = 0.75 
3. Endowment = 20 tokens, Return from project = 0.5 
4. Endowment = 30 tokens, Return from project = 0.25 
 
Within each group, exactly 2 participants will be given each of the three possible combinations of the 
endowment and return from project. This means that in each group, 2 participants will have an 
endowment of 10 tokens and a return from project of 0.25, 2 participants will have an endowment of 
20 tokens and a return from project of 0.5 and 2 participants will have an endowment of 30 tokens 
and a return from project of 0.75. The allocation of these combinations of endowment and return from 
project within the group is random. Your combination of endowment and return from project will 
remain the same throughout the entire experiment. 
 
Your task is to decide how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the tokens you 
want to contribute to a project and how many of them to keep for yourself. The five other members 
of your group have to make the same decision.  
 
Every token that you do not contribute to the project automatically belongs to you and earns you 
one ECU. 
 
Every token that you do contribute to the project will earn each group member (including yourself) 
their respective return from project in ECU. 
 
Your income therefore consists of: 
 




(2) The “Income from the project”. This income is calculated as follows:  
Your income from the project = your return from project times the total contributions to the project.  
 
Your Part 1 income in ECUs is: 
 
(Your Endowment – tokens contributed to the project by you) + Your Return from project*(sum of 
all tokens contributed to the project by all members of your group) 
 
When making your decision, the following input-screen will appear: 
 
 
At the top of the screen, you will be informed of the endowment and return from project of the other 
members of your group. (The example used above is only for illustrative purposes). You have to decide 
how many tokens you contribute to the project by typing a number between 0 and your endowment 
in the input field. This field can be reached by clicking it with the mouse. By deciding how many tokens 
to contribute to the project, you automatically decide how many tokens you keep for yourself. After 
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entering the amount of tokens you contribute you must press the O.K. button using the mouse. Once 




In Part 2 of the experiment, you will be asked to estimate for each of the three possible combinations 
of endowment and return from project the average contribution to the project within your group. You 
will therefore be required to make three decisions. Note that when estimating the average 
contribution for your combination of the endowment and return from project, you should estimate 
the contribution of the other participant with the same combination as you.  
 
You will be paid according to how close your estimate is to the actual average contribution for that 
particular combination of endowment and return from project. You will be paid £1 for each estimate 
that is within 0.5 tokens of the actual average contribution value in either direction. You will be paid 
£0.60 for each estimate between 0.5 and 1.5 tokens from the actual average contribution value in 
either direction. You will be paid £0.30 for each estimate between 1.5 and 3.5 tokens from the actual 
average contribution value in either direction. You will receive no additional payment for estimates 
further than 3.5 tokens from the actual average contribution value.  
 








At the top of the screen, you will be reminded of your endowment and return from project. In the 
remaining three boxes you will see each of the three possible combinations of endowment and return 
from project. (The example used above is only for illustrative purposes). In all three boxes, you must 
estimate the average contribution of the other members of your group with that particular 
combination of endowment and return from project. To input your estimate you must type a number 
between 0 and the endowment for that particular estimate. For example, when estimating the average 
contribution for those with endowment of 10 tokens and return from project of 0.25, you must enter 
a number between 0 and 10. As another example, when estimating the average contribution for those 
with endowment of 30 and return from project of 0.75, you must enter a number between 0 and 30.  
 
Your total earnings for the experiment are therefore equal to your Part 1 earnings converted into £ 




Do you have any questions? Please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to your desk. Please 
do not ask any question out loud. 
 
To ensure everybody understands, each of you will need to answer a few control questions, which you 





Please complete the questions below. In a couple of minutes someone will come to your desk to check 
your answers. Once everybody answers the following questions correctly, the experiment will start. 
(The decisions and earnings used for the questions below are simply for illustrative purposes. In the 
experiment decisions and earnings will depend on the actual choices of the participants.). 
 
 
1. Suppose you have an endowment of 20 and a return from project of 0.5 Suppose that nobody 
(including yourself) contributes any token to the project. What is: 
 
 Your income ?........... 
 The income of the other group members with endowment of 10 tokens?........... 
 The income of the other group member with endowment of 20 tokens?........... 
 The income of the other group members with endowment of 30 tokens?........... 
 
2. Please complete the following table: 
 









10 0.75 0    
10 0.75 4    
20 0.5 1    
20 0.5 12    
30 0.25 8    
30 0.25 15    
Total Contributed to Project:     
 
3. Suppose the average contribution for a particular combination of endowment and return from 
project was 15.5. Suppose you estimate the average will be 13, another group member estimates 10, 
another group member estimates 12 and another group member estimates 16. What is the payment 





 The group member with estimate 10?........... 
 The group member with estimate 12?........... 
 The group member with estimate 16?........... 
 
4. Will your group change or remain the same during the experiment? ……………. 
 






Appendix 4.C: Additional Statistical Tests 




Heterogeneous   
Endowment 
Inverse Proportional 
Control -1.946* -1.179 -0.417 -1.125 
Heterogeneous 
Return 
- 0.844 1.838* 0.919 
Heterogeneous   
Endowment 
- - 0.877 0.084 
Inverse - - - -0.867 
Note: The test is the Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney-U) test. The figures presented are 










Table C: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test z-Statistics for differences in beliefs about each type (Experiment 1). 
Treatment Beliefs About 
Hetero. Return 
(20, 0.25)|(20, 0.5) (20, 0.5)|(20, 0.75) (20, 0.25)|(20, 0.75) 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
Hetero. Endowment 
(10, 0.5)|(20, 0.5) (20, 0.5)|(30, 0.5) (10, 0.5)|(30, 0.5) 
0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
Inverse 
(10, 0.75)|(20, 0.5) (20, 0.5)|(30, 0.25) (10, 0.75)|(30, 0.25) 
0.002*** 0.006*** 0.002*** 
Proportional 
(10, 0.25)|(20, 0.5) (20, 0.5)|(30, 0.75) (10, 0.25)|(30, 0.75) 
0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
 





Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.25) Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.75) 
(10, 0.75) 0.178 -0.356 (10, 0.25) -1.836* -2.429** 
(20, 0.5) - -0.356 (20, 0.5) - -1.599 
 
Table E: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test z-Statistics for Within-Treatment Differences in (Overall) Beliefs 
(Experiment 2). 
Inverse  Proportional 





Heterogeneous   
Endowment 
Inverse Proportional 
Control 0.351 0.173 0.509 -0.179 
Heterogeneous 
Return 
- 0.073 0.134 -0.563 
Heterogeneous   
Endowment 
- - 0.230 -0.542 
Inverse - - - -0.795 




Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.25) Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.75) 
(10, 0.75) 1.778* 1.379 (10, 0.25) -0.533 0.889 
(20, 0.5) - -1.156 (20, 0.5) - 0.770 
 
 











(10, 0.75) -1.867* -0.267 -0.978 
(20, 0.5) 0.356 -0.622 -0.622 











(10, 0.25) -2.310** -2.192** -2.547** 
(20, 0.5) -2.073** -2.429** -2.547** 
(30, 0.75) -2.312** -1.481 -2.134** 
 
Table G: Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test z-statistics for differences in beliefs about each type between each 








Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.25) (20, 0.5) (30, 0.25) (20, 0.5) (30, 0.25) 
(10, 0.75) -0.622 -0.133 2.224** 0.533 0.889 1.156 









Type (20, 0.5) (30, 0.75) (20, 0.5) (30, 0.75) (20, 0.5) (30, 0.75) 
(10, 0.25) -0.652 -1.599 0.533 0.712 -0.889 0.889 








In this final chapter, the main findings and contributions to the literature from each of the preceding 
three chapters are discussed, including potential avenues for future research that the results may point 
towards.  
Chapter 2 (“Reputation Mechanisms and the Number of Possible Feedback Ratings: A Comparative 
Experiment”) presented an experiment featuring a multi-period auction with multiple buyers and 
sellers. There is moral hazard in the sense that the seller does not have to honour the sale having been 
paid; the seller incurs a cost if they decide to send the good to the winning bidder. The auction was 
designed this way to mirror peer-to-peer internet auction/commerce websites as much as possible.  
Two treatments featured reputation mechanisms with different numbers of possible ratings that could 
be given (2 and 7). A third treatment was a control and featured no reputation mechanism. As such, 
Chapter 2 presented an investigation firstly into the effect of having access to a reputation mechanism. 
Specifically, the effect of having a greater number of possible ratings that can be assigned and whether 
this increases the benefit to consumers. 
The results presented suggest that the presence of a reputation mechanism leads to improvements 
for the bidders, which is in line with the existing literature. In the experimental market, trust in the 
sellers (implicit in the bidding process) did not, on average, give positive profits. Thus, the presence of 
a reputation mechanism enabled the bidders to learn this and lower their bids over time due to the 
nature of the reputation mechanism as an information transmission device. The bidders used the 
mechanism broadly as expected, the higher ratings were given more frequently if the seller sent the 
good. The reputation mechanism benefit bidders in another way; they act as a constraint on sellers’ 
(bad) behaviour. The analysis presented suggests that sellers are indeed more likely to honour the sale 
when bidders have a reputation mechanism available to them. Nonetheless, the winning auction price 
remained a significant determinant of seller behaviour across all treatments.  
The real contribution of Chapter 2 is in the comparison between two different reputation mechanisms 
that vary only in the number of possible ratings that can be assigned. All the above effects of the 
reputation mechanism are even stronger when the mechanism has 7 possible ratings as opposed to 
only 2. It is worth noting that the seller only has two possible actions (a binary send or not decision) 
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and thus 2 possible feedback values should be sufficient to transmit the entire action space of the 
seller. This suggests that having a greater number of possible feedback ratings will indeed be beneficial 
in terms of the core aims of a reputation mechanism system; enabling learning and limiting bad 
behaviour. Since a parameter as simple as the number of possible ratings can have a significant effect 
of the behaviour of users, it is important to be careful when designing reputation mechanisms in order 
to maximise their effectiveness for consumers. This makes these findings particularly important for 
internet based peer to peer marketplaces. Possible avenues for future research include investigating 
the limits of these findings i.e. the optimal number of possible ratings that can be given for a particular 
situation and its determinants.  
Chapter 3 (“Sequential Equilibrium and Moral Hazard Auctions”) developed theoretical predictions for 
a reputation based sequential equilibrium in a multi-period moral hazard auction market featuring 
multiple bidders and a single seller. In addition, the results of an experiment designed to test the 
derived predictions are presented. For control purposes, we also include a canonical private value 
auction and a moral hazard auction (i.e. a simplified version of the construct featured in Chapter 2). 
The theoretical model featured a multi-period auction with moral hazard and some known probability 
that the seller was an automated seller that would always overcome the moral hazard by sending the 
good to the winning bidder. A reputation sequential equilibrium is developed featuring; a fully 
contingent conditional bidding strategy, a Bayesian belief system and a profit-maximising complete 
seller strategy. It matches a canonical sequential equilibrium in the sense that the (rational) seller 
mimics a ‘good’ seller by sending the good in the early periods before not sending it in the final period. 
A primary contribution of Chapter 3 is thus the extension of the sequential equilibrium reputation 
framework to a multi-period, multi-buyer auction market. 
The results of the two control treatments are broadly in line with existing literature. Behaviour in the 
novel treatment shows broad support for the qualitative features of the reputation building 
equilibrium prediction, despite substantial qualitative deviation from the precise equilibrium 
predictions. Bidders make significantly reduced bids if the winning bidder does not receive the good 
(the equilibrium prediction is that they should stop bidding completely). Sellers send the good with 
high probability in the first 2 periods and then substantially reduce the probability in the final period 
of each 3-period block (the equilibrium prediction is to send the good with certainty in the first 2 
periods and not send with certainty in the final period). The key is that the very presence of the 
computerised, ‘good’ seller is enough to encourage better behaviour in some of the periods by sellers 
than otherwise in a baseline treatment that does not feature the ‘good’ sellers at all. Thus, Chapter 3 
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shows that the behavioural patterns characteristic of the sequential equilibrium reputation framework 
extends into a repeated, multi-bidder moral hazard auction setting. From here, future research 
agendas may wish to consider other multiplayer (more than two) scenarios where the sequential 
equilibrium reputation building hypothesis may also be expected to apply. It may also prove to be a 
rich vein of inquiry for theorists as there is much work to do be done in terms of generalising the results 
of Chapter 3 to other multi-player market-based games within the sequential equilibrium reputation 
framework.  
Chapter 4 (“Public Goods Games with Structural Heterogeneities in Endowment and Marginal Return”) 
featured two public goods experiments; the first one-shot and the second repeated. A total of 5 
treatments were conducted. In the two novel treatments, both the initial endowment and marginal 
return co-vary either positively (i.e. proportionally) or negatively (i.e. inversely). The treatment with 
the inverse relationship was inspired by the empirical observation that in the UK higher earners are 
more likely to obtain private provision of public provided goods such as health care and education. In 
two more control treatments, only the initial endowment or the marginal return are heterogeneous. 
A final control has fully homogeneous groups.  
In the treatment where the initial endowment and marginal return are inversely related, there is a 
conflict between two normatively appealing contribution rules; equality of contributions as a 
proportion of endowment and equality of contributions as a proportion of marginal return. Indeed, 
the behaviour in the one-shot experiment is indicative of this conflict. In particular, the elicited beliefs 
showed a clear conflict between those with high endowment and those with high marginal return. This 
conflict is not present in any of the other treatments, neither in theory nor behaviourally.  
A second experiment was conducted in which the two novel treatments were repeated to investigate 
the robustness of the one-shot results. When the endowment and marginal return were proportionally 
related, contributions were proportional to endowment/marginal return i.e. contributions as a 
proportion of endowment/marginal return were not different. By contrast, when the endowment and 
marginal return were inversely related, there was no difference in absolute contributions i.e. those 
with higher endowments were contributing less as a proportion of endowment but more as a 
proportion of marginal return. Thus, it appears that when the two normatively appealing contributions 
rules are opposed, subjects revert to another appealing contribution rule; equality of absolute 
contributions. This highlights the importance of normative appeal in deciding focal points or social 
norms in experimental public goods games. Since these are the first experimental tests of groups that 
are heterogeneous in both the initial endowment and marginal return, these findings represent one 
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of the major contributions of the chapter. It gives a valuable insight into the importance of contribution 
norms in heterogeneous public goods games. There are also many other potential routes for future 
projects, to consider the potential effect of, for example, reward/punishment mechanisms or pre-play 
communication on the behaviour of heterogeneous groups of the kind presented in Chapter 4.  
Further, the equity implications of the public goods mechanism under the various structures on the 
initial endowment and marginal return are explored. The inverse relationship leads to a significant 
reduction in inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient in both the one-shot and every period of 
the repeated experiment. In contrast, a proportional relationship between endowment and marginal 
return has no effect on the Gini coefficient whatsoever, leaving the pre-existing inequality at the same 
level. Thus, under the inverse structure, the public goods mechanism is equity improving whilst under 
the proportional structure it is not.  
 
